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ÎREPACB
Most schools of historic interpretation agree that 
Theobald Theodor von Bethmann Hollweg, fifth Chancellor of 
the German Empire, stood for a short time at the focus of 
European history; his encouragement of Austria-Hungary 
early in July 1914 was the most important turning point in 
the crisis precipitated by the murder at Sarajevo. The his-» 
tory of the progressive involvement of European nations 
following Germany's support of Austria-Hungary has been re­
lated often enough, ^uite the opposite is true of Bethmann 
Hollweg's earlier diplomacy. Very little attention has been 
given to the foreign policy of the man at the center of that 
fateful series of events, although for five years preceding 
it, he had directed a consistent and conciliatory policy for 
the German Empire. The nature of his choice in the final 
crisis, the reason for his decision, cannot be fully under­
stood without an examination of the man's foreign policy from 
his accession to the office of Chancellor in 1909 to the end 
of 1913. Since it was his main endeavor to bring about a 
change in Anglo-German relations, it is most fruitful to con­
centrate a limited study on his direction of German policy to­
ward Great Britain during the period in question.
This study is organized around four specific events or 
crises in Anglo-German relations: Bethmann Hollweg's first
ill
efforts at a reconciliation with Great Britain, the 1911 
Morocco crisis, Lord Haldane’s mission to Berlin in 1912, and 
the Balkan Wars. Each of the four chapters seeks to ascertain 
the effect of one event or crisis on the diplomatic situation 
between the two countries. An introduction briefly examines 
Bethmann Hollweg's background and early career, his personal 
relationship with the Emperor, the constitutional position of 
a Chancellor in the German Empire, and the general European 
situation on his accession to the position of Chancellor.
Nearly all of the material is taken from two primary 
sources, the series of German Foreign Office documents,
Die grosse Politik der europaeischen Kabinette 1870-1914, 
and the published British Foreign Office papers, British 
Documents on the Origins of the War 1898-1914. Work on 
this study was greatly facilitated by the fact that both 
series are topically arranged. Volumes XXVIII to XXXV of 
the 40-volume German publication covered the topics under 
consideration, though other volumes were used for occasional 
reference. The profusion of editorial comment in these 
volumes often led to other pertinent sources, particularly 
to biographical works. All translations from the German in 
these and other documents were made directly from the original 
Volumes VI, VII, and IX of the British documents contains 
material on the same topics. Volumes VI and VII deals speci­
fically with the Anglo-German tensions, while the two-part
iv
volume IX deals with the origins and conduct of the Balkan 
Wars. Other volumes of the series were used for occasional 
reference.
A number of sources contain some primary material on 
narrower aspects of the topic. Ernst Jaeckh's biographical 
study, Kiderlen-Waechter der Staatsmann und Mensch, reveal 
details of Bethmann Hollweg’s relationship to his Foreign 
Office. Admiral von Tirpitz's apologetic Politische Bokumente 
give a detailed, if somewhat biased, account of the Navy’s 
persistent opposition to the Chancellor's policy toward Great 
Britain. Of a number of important biographical and autobio­
graphical sources, the most useful were Bethmann Hollweg's 
Reflections on the World War, Sir Edward Grey's Twenty-Five 
Years 1892-1916, and Erich Eyck's Das persoenliche Regiment 
Wilhelms II.
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INÎROIXJCTION
It is fitting to use Bethmann*s own words to summarize 
the diplomatic situation which faced him when he became 
Chancellor in 1909. The previous Chancellor, Bernhard von 
Buelow, later gave a very optimistic summary of that situa­
tion, describing it as the most favourable since the days of 
Bismarck. In a conversation with the Austrian Foreign
Minister Alois Graf Aerenthal in 1909, Bethmann himself
1agreed with this summary in general terms. He admitted
...that he was unfamiliar with the complicated gearwork 
of foreign policy, that it would cost him much effort to 
become familiar with this department. His main endeavour 
would be to obtain goodwill abroad and to reduce as much 
as possible the many areas of friction in Germany's inter­
national relations. In this sphere, Prince Buelow had 
left him a well-managed heritage, a fact which would make 
his task significantly easier.
After the war, however, he made a totally different
estimate of Beulow's heritage. It is reproduced here at
length because it represents a remarkably objective analysis
2of Germany's diplomatic situation:
In the year 1909, the situation which I am broadly
^Ludwig Bittner, Hans Uebersberger, Oesterreich-Ungams 
Aussenpolitik von der bosnischen Krise 1§ôë bis zum krlegsaus-
SrucE feljtT' TVien. 19%)'ÏT. # % ' l   on. ■■flëri"aftfr---
cited as O. U. A .) Report by Aerenthal.
^Th. von Bethmann Hollweg, Reflections on the World War. 
Before the War. (London, 1919) Ï,
attempting to describe here was based on the fact that 
England had firmly taken its stand on the side of France 
and Russia in pursuit of its traditional policy of 
opposing whatever Continental Power for the time being 
was the strongest; and that Germany held fast to its 
naval programme, had given a definite direction to its 
Eastern policy, and had, moreover, to guard against a 
French antagonism that had in no wise been mitigated by 
its policy in later years. And if Germany saw a formid­
able aggravation of all the aggressive tendencies of 
Franco-Eussian policy in England's pronounced friend­
ship with this Dual Alliance, England on its side had 
grown to see a menace in the strengthening of the German 
fleet and a violation of its ancient rights in our 
Eastern policy. Words had already passed on both sides. 
The atmosphere was chilly and clouded with distrust.
Under these conditions the position of Germany was
all the more precarious, seeing that the Triple Alliance 
had lost much of its internal solidarity, even if exter­
nally it seemed still to hold good. This was not so,
however, as between us and Austria-Hungary, where the 
closest understanding prevailed....But Italy, after 
coming to an understanding with the Western Powers over 
Morocco and Tripoli..., was more and more clearly draw­
ing closer to France....Besides, preoccupations with its 
interests in the Mediterranean obliged Italy to look to 
England; to say nothing of the formidable prospect with 
which it was faced in the case of hostilities with 
England as its insular position put it quite at the 
mercy of the English fleet. The attitude of Italy at 
the Algeciras Conference and during the Bosnian crisis 
was sufficiently suggestive of the real state of the 
case. Its flirtations with the Entente had led to 
dangerous intimacies.
The external situation in the summer of 1909 may 
then be impartially summed up as follows : England,
France and Russia were associated in close coalition.... 
The grave controversies of earlier times between England 
and France or England and Russia had been got rid of by 
agreements from which each party had received material 
advantages. Italy, whose Mediterranean interests had 
brought differences between it and the Western Powers 
but had also brought it into dependence on them, had 
been steadily drawing closer to their group. The cement 
that bound the whole structure of the coalition together 
was the community of interest, of do ut des, and by the 
conflict of each separate Power with %rmany.
This analysis should by no means be dismissed as "wisdom
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after the fact,” for Bethmann*s entire foreign policy was 
clearly based on it. The Leitmotif of the passage repro­
duced above is insecurity. This insecurity was characteris­
tic of Bethmann the diplomat, and in the summer of 1914 it 
determined the nature of his decision.
To understand the foreign policy of the fifth Chancellor 
of the German Empire, a knowledge of his constitutional 
position is essential. Theoretically, Germany was a federa­
tion of a number of states, which all retained a substantial 
degree of sovereignty. This fact was reflected in the 
structure of the Imperial Parliament, which consisted of 
the Bundesrat, an upper house composed of delegates appoint­
ed by the federal states, and the Reichstag, elected by un­
iversal manhood suffrage. This lower house had a very 
limited right to initiate legislation, but derived its 
considerable power from the right to grant or refuse approval 
of all laws, including the budget. Thus it had, in theory, 
the leverage to increase its powers at the expense of the 
executive, though it displayed very little desire to do so; 
it seemed curiously devoid of a "will to power."
The state of Prussia had a preponderance in the limited 
area of Imperial jurisdiction, both through the number of 
its members in the Bundesrat (three more than required for 
veto of any constitutional change) and through the fact 
that the Emperor was also King of Prussia, while his Imperial
4.
Chancellor was simultaneously President of the Prussian
Council of Ministers. This Prussian preponderance in the 
Empire is not surprising, since that state contained roughly 
two-thirds of the land area and population of Germany. 
Moreover, Prussia had clearly borne the burden of German
unification.
Because of these constitutional peculiarities, the 
position of the Chancellor was an extremely difficult one.
He had to concern himself with parliamentary majorities 
almost as much as the Prime Minister in Great Britain, 
because of the Reichstag's powers of financial obstruction. 
Since he was responsible not to the Reichstag which he 
manipulated, but to the Bnperor, he had to reconcile the 
Emperor's wishes with Reichstag possibilities. This was 
never easy, but in the twentieth century, the shift to the 
left in popular politics rendered it increasingly difficult. 
The growth of the Social Democratic party indicated well 
enough that many Germans could no longer be reconciled 
with the Imperial prerogative on any terms.
The overlapping of the Prussian and Imperial administra­
tions added to the difficulties. In contrast to Imperial 
Secretaries of State, the Prussian Ministers had direct
In the Reichstag elections of 1912, the Social Democrats 
became the strongest single party; they had received ap­
proximately one-third of the total vote.
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access to, and therefore great influence on the Emperor.
Their influence was for the moat part a solidly conservative
one, in direct contradiction to popular political trends.
In a recent study of Bethmann's domestic politics, H. G.
Snarzlik concluded that the position of Chancellor required
great mediating talents in view of this basic schism in the
Empire’s political structure, and that Bethmann possessed
4.such talents to a high degree. In his opinion, Bethmann 
realized that only a strengthening of the position of 
Chancellor could salvage the system, and that he achieved 
such a strengthening at the right time.
In foreign affairs, the Chancellor had the constitu­
tional task of implementing the Emperor’s foreign policy.
His own acquiescence in that policy was morally required, 
and to a man of Bethmann’s nature such moral considerations 
were of great consequence. He certainly considered him­
self to be personally responsible for the foreign policy of 
Germany. The Imperial constitution made the conduct of a 
unified foreign policy excessively difficult. The Depart­
ment of Foreign Affairs, under an Imperial State Secretary, 
had no immediate access to the Emperor, but was responsible 
to the Chancellor, whose task it was to defend the department’s
^H. G. Zmarzlik, Bethmann Hollweg als Reichskanzler 
1909-1914. (Duesseldorî,' l95'7) pp. $-25.
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policy. However, numerous other officials with interests in 
and influences on foreign affairs did have direct access to 
the Bnperor, These included all Prussian Ministers, three 
top navy executives, three top army executives, in addition 
to commanding Generals and Fleet Admirals. The policy these 
persons advocated was seldom that approved by the Foreign 
Office. While they bickered with each other, the military 
gentlemen tended to unite against the "mere civilians" of 
the Foreign Office, who were represented by the one voice of 
the Chancellor,
In the most extreme condition, this situation permitted 
the navy to conduct its own foreign policy, complete with 
publicity organs superior to those of the Foreign Office, 
and with a network of its own Ambassadors in the persons of 
Naval Attaches to the Embassies. These Attaches prepared 
political reports independent of, and often at variance with, 
those of the Ambassadors. They sent these reports directly 
to their military superiors who, as noted, had direct access
to the Emperor. The German Enperor retained a measure of
real sovereignty only in his administration of the armed 
forces. Under cover of that complete administrative sover­
eignty was conducted a second German foreign policy over 
which the Chancellor had virtually no control. This was 
a constitutional anomaly of great importance for the Chan­
cellor's conduct of foreign policy.
7.
Was Bethmann Hollweg suited by temperament and experience 
for this position, which the great Bismarck had described as 
requiring more talent and energy than he himself possessed?
We must put out of mind the picture of the Bismarckian 
Chancellor, for Bethmann possessed an entirely different 
sort of qualification, which was in itself not unsuited to 
the position. In 1879» after a distinguished school career, 
Bethmann entered government service at the age of twenty- 
three, in the position of District Magistrate. He advanced 
very rapidly in the Prussian administration, serving from 
1899 to 1905 as President of Mark Brandenburg, He attained 
cabinet rank in 1905 as the Prussian Minister of the Inter­
ior. In 1907, he entered the Imperial administration as 
Secretary of State for the Interior, while retaining a 
position in the Prussian administration as Vice-Chancellor, 
That he was a brilliant and conscientious administrator is 
granted even by his predecessor, von Buelow, who was not 
inclined to flatter him.
A contemporary German historian describes him typically 
as a thinker of great power and depth, very dependable, 
but handicapped by a certain ponderousness, a predilection 
for brooding, a lack of flair or of ability to inspire.^
^W. Prauendienst, Bethmann Hollweg, Neue deutsche 
Biographie, (Berlin, 1955) II, pp. 188-93, Johannes Siehler, IDeutsohe Geschichtc. (Berlin, I960) VI, p. 314.
^J. Buehler, Geschichte, VI, pp. 314-16.
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Other descriptions corroborate this picture, particularly 
on the qualities of seriousness and integrity. He was in 
every respect the opposite of Prince von Buelow, who had 
earned the nickname "the eel". Significantly, Bethmann had 
little military background ; the noble title was of compar­
atively recent origin, and his family was traditionally
7devoted to banking, not soldiering. He was not a Junker, 
and his rapport with that class and with military officers 
on the whole remained poor even after the Emperor bestowed 
upon him the rank of Major General. In a Prussian General's 
uniform, he still looked the bemused philosopher.
Of necessity, Bethmann's political strength lay in his 
personal relationship with the Enperor. Unlike Buelow, he 
could not be his friend and boon companion, because their 
personalities were in almost every respect antithetical. 
William II was a man of quick, broad but shallow intellect, 
a man who cultivated the positiveness and sharpness of the 
military officer. Not only was the philosophic Bethmann 
unsuited by temperament for contact with his monarch on a 
social plane, but he lacked also the military background and 
bearing which William II prized in his intimates. Bethmann's 
hold on the Etaperor was twofold: his flawless reputation
abroad as a man of sincerity and goodwill was of consider-
^P. Haselmayr, Biplomatische Geschichte des zweiten 
Reichs von 1871-1918. I München ̂ 1963") VI, ii, p. 14. ”
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able benefit in diplomacy, and did much to offset the 
Etaperor's less enviable reputation. More important, William 
II found his uncompromising devotion to the monarchy a 
pleasant change after Chancellor Buelow*s failure to defend 
him from Reichstag criticism. This, the Etaperor correctly 
assumed, would not happen with Bethmann.
While the letter's loyalty found frequent and enthusias­
tic expression, it was not the loyalty of a sycophant.
Bethmann's devotion was not to William II personally, but 
to the Hohenzollem monarchy, to the principle of royalty.
His was the proud, arrogant loyalty which is supposedly 
found in the best of that ancient nobility to which he did 
not belong. At times, Bethmann must have been consciously 
protecting the principle of monarchy from the aberrations 
of the individual monarch. He sought, by means of intrigue 
and discreet circumvention, to control the Emperor's sudden 
interventions in diplomacy, in a manner designed to prevent 
damage to the image of the Etaperor. Throughout his career, 
the fifth Chancellor treated William II's startling directives 
as if they were merely theoretical speculations, not designed 
for immediate implementation. Only in this manner could he 
achieve a semblance of continuity in his policies.
This is not to say that Bethmann always avoided taking 
a strong position directly in opposition to the Etaperor. In 
fact, William II, who was somewhat given to thoughtless
10.
sarcasms, occasionally had to retreat in the face of his
Chancellor's indignant defence. While it was not Bethmann's
policy to use the threat of resignation as a lever, he made
it quite clear that any attempt to circumvent his constitu-
8tional authority would bring about his departure. ITor did 
his devotion to the Hohenzollem monarchy prevent him from 
censuring any political interference on the part of the 
Royal Family. The Crown Prince, who was on more than one 
occasion the recipient of an official reprimand from the 
Chancellor, repaid this attention with an enduring hatred 
and constant intrigues against Bethmann.
From the Emperor's standpoint, Bethmann was in many 
respects a most uncomfortable Chancellor; this is one 
reason why he was not altogether unsuited for the position. 
Because of the constitutional peculiarities of the German 
Empire, the Chancellor had to be a person talented in 
mediation, who could correlate and reconcile the different 
branches of the government. These talents Bethmann possess­
ed to a high degree. That he was at crucial times lacking 
in firmness appears tragic in retrospect only. It must 
be remembered that he saw as his diplomatic task the im­
provement of Germany's position and security in the world, 
not the prevention of the World War. He did not have the
Q The best example of this is cited in connection with 
the Morocco crisis of 191I.
11.
advantage of hindsight which today makes some of his actions 
seem tragically weak.
Through the Versailles War Guilt clause and through 
less than objective analyses of history prompted by the 
two world wars, Wilhelmine Germany has acquired the reputa­
tion of a saber-rattling Junker-dominated upstart among 
nations. The years between the wars and the years after 
the last war have not entirely erased this reputation. The 
fact that this man, who was centrally concerned with Germany's 
original "aberration," fits so poorly into the picture as a 
leader of such a country, makes him an object worthy of the 
closest examination.
CHAPTER I
BETHMAM'S FIRST APPROACH TO GREAT BRITAIN
Bethmann Hollweg*s efforts to achieve an understanding 
with Great Britain were not the first such efforts made 
on behalf of Germany; nor was his approach a new one. The 
two most immediate antecedents of this direction in German 
diplomacy were Buelow’s last attempts to achieve a similar 
understanding, and Alfred von Kiderlen-Vaechter's conversa­
tions on the subject with British Ambassador Sir Edward 
Goschen when the former was temporary Foreign Affairs Secre­
tary in the Buelow cabinet. Bethmann benefited directly from 
Buelow’s experience, since, as an important member of the 
cabinet, he was informed of the major aspects of diplomacy. 
Kiderlen’s experience became available when Bethmann in the 
autumn of 1909, requested his advice on a proposed approach 
to Great Britain, and later when, at Bethmann's insistence, 
Kiderlen again became Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.
In the autumn of 1908, following the Emperor's humilia­
tion through the public outcry at his indiscreet Daily 
Telegraph interview, Buelow again considered the question of 
Anglo-German rivalry. The diplomatic actions arising out of 
this must have been very instructive for Bethmann; they 
clearly revealed the strengths and weaknesses of the Chan­
cellor's constitutional position in Imperial Germany.
13.
Among higher officials in Germany, there existed two well- 
defined points of view on the subject of the Anglo-German 
discord and its solution. The diplomatic viewpoint, which 
Chancellor Buelow adopted at this time, considered the 
rivalry from the standpoint of Great Britain’s key position 
in the European "alliance” system. The strategic viewpoint, 
as defended by Admiral von Tirpitz, the Secretary of State 
for the navy, considered the military problems in the even­
tuality of an Anglo-German war. The former sought to reduce 
Anglo-German animosity by reducing British suspicions of 
Germany's naval expansion. The latter sought to insure 
peace by constructing a naval power position which would 
deter British aggression, and would eventually force British 
cooperation— or even friendship.
Buelow began his efforts with an attempt to reduce the 
stubborn resistance of the Navy Secretary. He had to con­
vince him of the importance of the naval rivalry in produc­
ing the Anglo-German discord, for this was the point at 
which Buelow saw an opportunity for an easing of the tension. 
To this end, he forwarded to Tirpitz Ambassador Paul Graf 
von Wolff-Mettemich’s reports from England, which placed 
great emphasis on the naval rivalry.^ Tirpitz, however,
iJohannes Lepsius, A. M. Bartholdy, Friedrich Thimme, 
eds. Die grosse Politik der europaischen Kabinette 1871-1914 
(Berlin: 1951) 3QCVIII, #10227, pp. 5-6l (Hereafter cited as 
D. G. P.)
14.
rejected this interpretation, placing emphasis rather on the 
trade rivalry and on the supposedly deliberate exaggerations
Pof British party politics. late in November 1908, Buelow 
changed his tactics; he asked Tirpitz whether he could give 
assurances that the German navy could in the near future 
meet the British navy in battle with a fair chance of success.^ 
Tirpitz had to admit that this was not to be expected.^ How­
ever, he hastened to add his interpretation of this fact, 
which differed radically from that of Mettemich. The chances 
of war with Thgland could be reduced, he said, not by a 
naval agreement, but by an increase in the German navy.
Germany should pass as quickly as possible through a "danger 
period," during which British animosity would naturally be 
quite high. At present, Germany was still in the "danger 
period." He proposed to get her through it by a substan­
tial naval increase.
Despite this negative reply, Buelow acquainted Tirpitz 
with his plan for an Anglo-German détente.̂  He proposed 
a concentration on coastal defences and on submarines, and 
a twenty-five percent slowdown in the construction of capital
Zibid., XXVIII, #10227, pp. 5-6.
3lbid., XXVIII, #10235, pp. 21-23.
4lbid.. XXVIII, #10238, pp. 26-28.
5lbid.. XXVIII, #10242, pp. 38-40.
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ships. This procedure would reduce British animosity, what­
ever its origin, and would help Germany to pass through this 
so-called "danger period" without war.^
Tirpitz took two weeks to answer; during this time, 
anzious queries attested to the nervous anticipation of the 
German Foreign Office. Finally, on January 4, 1909, Tirpitz 
answered with an eminently reasonable document which, how­
ever, made no concession to the Chancellor's viewpoint 
The planned slowdown, he maintained, could only be inter­
preted as a German collapse under British pressure. The 
effect on the German diplomatic position would be disastrous 
in the long run. Furthermore, could such a slight postpone­
ment really remove British anxiety? Or would it merely 
weaken Germany's power position without bringing any benefit? 
The best prospect for peace, he argued, lay in a continua­
tion of the legally-established tempo of naval construction.
^E. L. Woodward pounced on the fact that, in this series 
of exchanges, Buelow used the term "danger period." Woodward 
interpreted this as a sign that Buelow also had in mind only 
a temporary understanding for the time period of the German 
navy's weg&ness. He implied that, following that time period, 
the understanding would be superfluous. E. L. Woodward,
Great Britain and the German Navy (Oxford, 1934) p. 263. 
ithis interpretation is open io" grave doubt. It is far more 
likely that Buelow only adopted the strategic point of view 
in order to convince the Admiral, who was more amenable to 
such arguments. Moreover, both Tirpitz's and Buelow's use 
of the term is not so much indicative of a German utilitar­
ian attitude towards treaties and understandings, as it is 
of a deep German mistrust of England.
'̂ D. G. P.. XXVIII, #10247, p. 51.
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not in an appeasement of the British, which could only lead 
to more extreme demands on their part.
This difference of opinion proved to be permanent, 
Buelow again pointed out the broader diplomatic consequences 
of the naval rivalry, but Tirpitz insisted that a mutual 
reduction which maintained the "two-power standard" was
Oabsolutely unacceptable. Instead, he advocated a ratio
of three-to-four which, in his opinion, provided a measure
9of security for both nations. Buelow and Mettemich 
greeted this proposal with unconcealed impatience. Met­
temich advised the Admiral not to propose the three-to-four
ratio unless he was ready for a war with Great Britain in
10the near future.
Buelow now called a conference, in which the most 
important military and civilian officials defended their
i iviews. According to the Chancellor, the purpose of the 
meeting was to decide if the three-to-four ratio proposed 
by Tirpitz constituted a valid basis for negotiations with
Gibid., XXVIII, #10254, pp. 67-69.
9lbid., XXVIII, #10254, 10257, pp. 67-69, 78-79.
, XXVHÎ, #10257, p p . 78-79, marginal notation 
by Buelow. XXVIII, #10258, p. 80.
I^Ibid., XXVIII, #10306, pp. 168-178. Present were 
Buelow, Bethmann Hollweg, Tirpitz, Moltke, Admiral Mueller, 
Wolff-Mettemich, Schoen.
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Great Britain. Buelow, Mettemich, the Foreign Affairs 
Secretary Wilhelm von Schoen, Bethmann and Colonel-General 
Helmuth von Moltke, Chief of the General Staff, defended 
the position that an understanding with Britain must be 
achieved, even at the cost of a slowdown of ship construc­
tion, They rejected the three-to-four ratio as a basis for 
negotiations. Tirpitz, though virtually unsupported, clung 
to his original position on all points. This conference of 
June 3 illustrated the fact that the Imperial Navy had 
developed for itself a role which the civilian leaders of 
the Empire could in no way harmonize with their general 
policy. Moreover, it appeared that the navy had determined 
to modify that general policy to fit its conception of the 
navy's role, rather than accept a modification itself.
The record of this meeting has the additional importance 
that it outlined Bethmann*s viewpoint on the subject before 
he became Chancellor. To make possible a German initiative, 
a definite proposal was needed, but the ratio proposed by 
the Admiral was not a suitable one. Perhaps a colonial 
agreement might provide the answer; but, of course, the 
present British tariff position made that difficult.
Could not the rate of shipbuilding be retarded, or the Navy 
Law be modified? The navy was obviously the key: what
could the navy offer if renewed efforts at a détente were 
made? Evidently, Bethmann thoroughly understood the situa-
18.
tion, and it appears that his initial lack of familiarity
with diplomacy was not as crucial a factor as it is often
made out to be. Perhaps in matters of diplomatic form he
had much to learn, but, while this would have disqualified
him for a consular position, it was scarcely a crucial
12defect in a Chancellor.
During this internal power struggle in Germany, nego­
tiations took place in a rather informal manner between 
Kiderlen-Waechter, then temporary Foreign Affairs Secretary, 
and the British Ambassador, Sir Edward Goschen. Kiderlen
proposed a political understanding based on mutual promises
13of non-aggression and neutrality in the event of war.
This approach had only one positive result: it provided a
quick and unofficial lesson on British attitudes in the 
question, which were fixed on limitation or reduction of 
German naval armament and on preservation of the Entente.
It is unlikely that Bethmann knew of this attempt before he 
became Chancellor, but he secured the benefit of the lesson 
by involving Kiderlen in his own attempt to obtain an
12Woodward illustrated his point that the Chancellor was 
a stranger to diplomacy with a second-hand allegation that, 
in a letter to Francis Joseph of Austria, he addressed that 
individual with the wrong titlei Woodward, Britain and the 
German Havy, p. 265, footnote.
I^G. P. Gooch, Harold Temperley, eds., British Documents 
on the Origins of the War 1898-1914. (Bond on, 1930) VI,
#174, PP* 2165-266. (Hereafter citVcf as B. D. D.)
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Anglo-Grerman understanding.
Buelow’s attempted détente came to an abrupt end with
his resignation in July, 1909. In the same month, the
British Parliament accepted a vastly increased Dreadnought
program; German diplomats could not fail to grasp the
significance of this sequence of events.
Bethmann renewed negotiation immediately on assuming
office as Chancellor; in fact, members of the Foreign
Office staff regarded his evident haste and determination
with some misgivings. Arthur Zimmermann, the Under-Secretary,
wroteÎ "The new Imperial Chancellor appears determined to
produce an understanding with England, and does not shrink
from grasping...the initiative himself for this purpose.
If only things work out well!"^^ series of memoranda had
been prepared during the Chancellor-crisis preceding Buelow *s
departure. Bethmann studied these, then invited Admiral
15Tirpitz to an interview on August 11. On the same day, 
he received word that Albert Ballin, a prominent German 
businessman, had arranged a contact with the British govern­
ment, which had voiced a desire to resume negotiations. Two 
days later, having received encouraging replies from Tirpitz,
^^Emst Jaeckh, Kiderlen-Waechter der Staatsmann und 
Mensch. (Berlin, 1925) II, p.36.
Alfred von Tirpitz, Politische Dokumente: I, Per 
Aufbau der deutschen Weltmacht. (Berlin, 1924) pp. 164- 
Tg5l
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he went, in the company of the Admiral, to seek the Emperor's
support. The latter approved negotiations both on a political
and a naval agreement,  ̂̂
One of the most important diplomatic skills is the
ability to recognize and exploit favorable situations of
a temporary nature. Here, Bethmann displayed this skill on
a high level. He recognized that his recent accession to
the Chancellorship and his extraordinary reputation for
sincerity gave him a significant but temporary advantage
17both at home and abroad. His precipitous haste, which the
professional diplomats had frowned on, permitted him to
re-open negotiations at a time when Anglo-German relations
seemed very poor. Furthermore, he had succeeded in bringing
Tirpitz to drop his insistence on the three-to-four ratio in
favor of one more acceptable to England.
The Chancellor now invited Sir Edward Goschen to his
office and formally proposed negotiations on a naval and a
18political agreement. He explained that, for Germany, the 
two agreements were necessarily connected, since a limitation 
of armaments could only take place between two friendly
IGp. G. P.. XXVIII, #10325, pp. 211-16.
17 On his reputation abroad, see Viscount Grey of Fallodon, 
Twenty-Five Years 1892-1916 (Hew York, 1925) and P. G. P., 
BCVIII, #1Ù328, pp. 219-20.
IGp. G. P., XXVIII, #10330, 10331, pp. 221-22. B. D. P ..
VI, #186-87, "pp. 283-84.
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nations. To Goschen’s interjection that the Bitente must 
not be forgotten, he replied that a formula could be found 
in which Britain’s present commitments would not suffer.
Sir Edward Grey reacted very warmly and voiced satisfaction 
at Bethmann’s step. The proposal for a naval agreement 
would be welcome, he explained, and the proposal for a
1Qpolitical agreement would receive sympathetic consideration.  ̂
In somewhat curious contrast to this expression of satisfac­
tion, the British intimated that Sir Edward Goschen urgently 
desired a vacation just then, but that this should not be 
regarded as an effort to postpone negotiationsi .That, how­
ever, was exactly the outcome; negotiations were postponed 
until October.
Bethmann used the resulting pause to prepare himself 
for the diplomatic task, for he intended to keep the matter 
as much as possible in his own hands. In conversations 
with Die low on the eve of the Chancellor change, Bethmann 
had admitted his relative lack of familiarity with diplomacy, 
but claimed that he would ’soon get the hang of foreign 
policy."20 To Buelow’s great disappointment, the new 
Chancellor did not come to him to "get the hang of it," 
but went instead to the temporarily disgraced Kiderlen- 
Waechter, at the time German representative in Bucharest.
19B. D. P .. VI, #187-91, pp. 284-88.
20prince von Buelow, Memoirs. (London, 1932) III, p. 12.
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Immediately on coming to office, Bethmann considered replac­
ing von Schoen, the Secretary of State for foreign Affairs.
He had no personal dislike for Schoen, and in fact, he 
worked with him very harmoniously for almost a year. How­
ever, the Chancellor, who was well aware of his own contem­
plative personality, thought he could work better with a 
stronger nature than that of Schoen. Notes went from the 
Foreign Office to Bucharest, informing Kiderlen of Bethmann’s 
feelings in the matter, but cautioning that an obvious cir-
21cumvention or brusque displacement of Schoen must be avoided.
When Bethmann made the customary official visit to Vienna, he
met Kiderlen and gave him the task of preparing a memorandum
on the coming Anglo-German talks.
This memorandum arrived in Berlin at the end of Septem- 
22her. Kiderlen stated at the outset that he, also, regard­
ed an Anglo-German detente as the worthiest objective of 
German foreign policy. Germany would not only benefit direct­
ly from such a step, but Austria and Italy would show great­
er loyalty to the Triple Alliance in direct relation to the 
improved Anglo-German relations. Kiderlen had no fear of a 
preventive war launched by Great Britain. He considered 
far more dangerous the probability of a series of Fashoda- 
like confrontations, which could lead to a situation in
^Ijaeckh, Kiderlen-Waechter, II, p. 41.
ZZphid., pp. 48-59.
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which Germany was forced to choose between a diplomatic set­
back or a war. Moreover, in the event of war with another 
power, Germany could expect Great Britain to be on the 
other side. To avoid these two dangers, a naval agreement 
must be coupled with a political understanding, if possible 
with a neutrality agreement. He considered such an agree­
ment necessary to dampen the aggressive tendencies of the 
Pranco-Russian partnership. Kiderlen also outlined a pro­
cedure for negotiation. The Chancellor must avoid giving 
the impression that he desired to wreck the Entente. There­
fore, the political agreement must be revealed very gradual­
ly. But it should precede the naval agreement, because the 
political sphere could be adjusted more easily thama the 
naval sphere, in which the intractability of the two Admir­
alties might cause difficulty.
The importance of this document, and Kiderlen's impor­
tance for these early negotiations, has at times been exag- 
23gerated. The memorandum does not represent a blueprint 
for Anglo-German relations, nor is it a startling insight 
into the German diplomatic situation. Buelow made essen­
tially the same estimate of the danger in the previously 
cited conference, and Bethman had voiced a similar viewpoint
^Both C. Waldron Bolen and Ernst Jaeckh imply that 
Kiderlen led the negotiations from behind the scenes, that 
Bethmann was merely his mouthpiece. 0. W. Bolen, "Kiderlen’s 
Policy in Haval Conversation^" Journal of Central European 
Mfairs (July, 1949) pp. 131-49% Jaeckh, Kiderlen-Waecliter, 
ÏÏ, pp. 41-45.
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even "before he became Chancellor.Nor was the suggested
modus operandi new. Bethmann secured the Emperor's and the
Navy Secretary's cooperation long before Kiderlen pronounced
this step essential. Furthermore, he constantly advised
cautious procedure, particularly stressing secrecy, and he
endeavored at all times to avoid giving an impression of
25haste once the negotiations were in progress.
This is not to underestimate the importance of Kiderlen's 
memorandum. It reinforced a number of Bethmann's ideas, and 
gave him the confidence to attempt to put them into opera­
tion. Indeed, certain phrases from the memorandum reappear­
ed from time to time in Bethmann's statements. Essentially, 
the Chancellor needed not Kiderlen's ideas, but his force­
ful personality and his self-confidence, qualities in which 
the Chancellor knew himself to be weak. There is no need to 
look far for an explanation of Bethmann's continued requests 
for Kiderlen's viewpoints. If, as seems likely, he intended 
to bring Kiderlen into the Foreign Office at the earliest 
opportunity, then it was only reasonable to keep him informed
24p. G, p,. X m i l ,  #10306, pp. 168-78,
^5ibid,. XXVIII, #10333, pp. 223-24 and footnote. The 
German Foreign Office accepted Kiderlen's document as extreme­
ly valuable, but made some very strong criticisms of his point 
of view. The criticisms exposed Kiderlen's lack of under­
standing of the British diplomatic situation. These marginal 
notations on Kiderlen's memorandum are signed by Flotow, 
whose opinions the Chancellor valued highly.
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and to consider his opinions on such a vital matter.
There were in Germany at least three great sources of 
danger to the delicate secret diplomacy which Bethmann had 
in mind. One such source of danger was the fbperor. Beth­
mann dutifully kept him informed; he noted his comments, 
hut he kept him out of harm's way as much as possible on the
pretext that his name should not be connected with a venture
27which might fail dismally. Another potential source of 
danger was German public opinion. Germany was a late ar­
rival on the colonial scene, but now that she had to a degree 
arrived there, her people were at least as amenable to the 
ideas of imperialism and "world power" as the people of the 
older colonial powers. In an era dominated by Admiral 
Mahan's concepts of the importance of sea power, the navy 
was regarded as the very embodiment of a nation's desire or 
capacity for "world power" status. Any attempt on the part 
of a government to place limits on its naval construction 
might be interpreted as a voluntary abdication of "world 
power" rank. Such organizations as the Navy League and the 
Pan-German League had both the means and the desire to pro­
pagate such views. Secrecy was therefore essential. A
Z^See the editor's footnote, B. G. P., XXVIII, #10333, 
pp. 223-24.
"̂̂ This was an obviously spurious excuse, since Bethmann 
specifically permitted Mettemich to state in London that 
the Emperor approved of the negotiations. Ibid., XXVIII, 
#10333, 10338, pp. 223-24, 227.
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press report in one country based on partial, biased or 
erroneous information could produce a state of public opin­
ion in which no negotiations could survive,
A third source of danger for the negotiations was the 
navy, particularly its Secretary of State, Admiral Tirpitz. 
Bethmann's relations with him began surprisingly well, a 
situation which did not last long. On August 13» without 
any evidence of pressure from the Chancellor, Tirpitz con­
ceded a naval ratio more favorable to Ihgland than the
28three-to-four ratio he had previously defended. Two
weeks later, however, the Admiral attempted to convince
Bethmann that a slight change of form represented a further
pq’concession” to Great Britain, Bethmann rebutted this 
proposal in an overbearing, schoolmasterly tone, explaining 
that he found it somewhat difficult to attach much importance 
to the mathematical result when the actual number of ships 
to be built was the same. Indeed, since the program would 
be completed somewhat sooner than under the old plan, and 
thus Germany could presumably start a new naval program at
Z^Ibid., XXVIII, #10325, pp. 211-216.
^^By building one more Dreadnought in 1909, and starting 
the "period of agreement” only in 1910, one Dreadnought 
fewer could be built during this period, thus producing a 
more favorable ratio for this period only. Tirpitz also 
included a proposal for a change of Ambassadors to Great 
Britain; to him, Mettemich and his ideas were anathema.
The Chancellor did not deign to notice this encroachment 
on his diplomacy. Ibid.. XXVIII, #10339, pp. 227-30.
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an earlier date, he did not think the British government
would be pleasantly surprised by the concession. Tirpitz
reverted back to his plan of August 13, which yielded a
reasonable ratio of approximately three-to-two in new
construction of capital ships.
When the talks resumed, they ran a.very-peculiar course.
It became clear in the fall of 1909 that there would be an
election in Great Britain in the near future. Bethmann and
William II saw the danger that the naval negotiations might
become involved as an issue in these elections, or that the
behavior of the British government might be determined more
by election needs than by the course of the talks with 
30Germany. On October 1, Bethmann telegraphed Mettemich
requesting information on the likelihood of an election.
He expressed the fear that in such an event the Liberal
government might attempt to gain a triumph out of the nego-
31tiations to help insure its re-election. To prevent 
this, Bethmann ordered a "dilatory procedure" until the 
British political scene had cleared somewhat.
This proved to be impossible, for the British government 
now showed a great desire to continue the negotiations. On 
October 12, Sir Edward Goschen, just returned from his
50lbid., X m i l ,  #10342, pp. 234-35. 
Slfbid.. XXVIII, #10343, p. 235.
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32"vacation," declared himself ready to begin the talks. 
Consequently, a meeting took place on October 14, in which 
Bethmann and Goschen negotiated while Schoen took notes— a 
procedure which Goschen disliked. This meeting produced 
only the most careful preliminary exploration.^^ Bethmann 
claimed that a political understanding would appropriately 
set the stage for a naval agreement. Such an understanding 
need not include anything contrary to Great Britain’s 
present friendships. Britain had not even concluded such a 
political agreement with France and Russia, Goschen observed. 
But he certainly hoped that a "suitable" formula might be 
found. On the subject of the naval agreement, Bethmann made 
it clear that the existing navy law must stand, but within 
its framework, ship construction might be slowed down to 
accomodate Great Britain. The Chancellor carefully avoided 
giving away the scope of the political agreement which he 
sought. All he would say was that it must be sufficient to 
enable him to defend the naval concessions in the Reichstag. 
Two weeks after this interview. Sir Edward Grey sent an 
optimistic message to the German A m b a s s a d o r . ^4 Again,
52% b i d ., XXVIII, #10346, p. 238.
5 3 l b i d ., XXVIII, #10347, pp. 239-43. B. D. P ., VI, #194-201, pp. 288-302. For report of October conversations,
#200, pp. 296-98.
34D. G. P.. XXVIII, #10354, pp. 255-58.
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Grey stressed the necessity of continuing negotiation.
would say at once that we should very much regret a 
suspension of negotiations. Business here might occasionally 
delay our replies, hut this would not he so great a drawback 
as the total suspension of negotiations." Grey further 
expressed his willingness to include a political understand­
ing, even a colonial understanding, in the negotiations.
The entire tone of the message was such that it could only 
lead to expectations of rapid success.
The turning point came in the next discussion, on 
35Hoveraher 4. Bethmann still held hack somewhat, for he 
did not present the draft of the proposed agreement which 
the German Foreign Office had p r e p a r e d . B u t  Grey's 
apparent optimism must have affected him to a degree, for 
he now introduced the neutrality principle under which each 
party was to state that it was not presently engaged in 
agreements with aggressive design against the other, and in 
the event of an attack on one party hy a third power, the 
other party was to maintain neutrality. Goschen repeated 
that Great Britain had no such agreements even with France 
and Russia. Neither did Britain have a naval agreement 
with those countries, replied the Chancellor; the situa­
tion with Germany was entirely new. Sir Edward Goschen
55%hid.. XXVIII, #10355, pp. 259-62. B. D. P.. VI, 
#204, pp. 307-9.
36For a text of this agreement, see Jaeckh, Kiderlen- 
Waechter, II, pp. 67-9.
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observed that Bethmann had spoken only of a temporary slow­
down of naval construction, not of a reduction of the German 
plan. Bethmann replied that naval agreements, by their very 
nature, extended over a strictly limited period of time; no 
country could promise never to exceed a certain level of 
naval construction. He had in mind a proposition which could 
give Great Britain a financial respite over the next few 
years. Then, depending on the world situation, a further 
agreement might be contemplated.
The meeting produced an immediate change of tone on 
the part of British diplomats. Two days later. Sir Edward 
Goschen, in a letter to Schoen, expressed disappointment 
over the limited nature of the naval concessions, and he 
doubted if his government could accept them as sufficient.
The neutrality proposal, on the other hand, went too far.^?
On November 15, Sir Charles Hardinge, a Foreign Office employee, 
commented in a similar sense to Mettemich. Finally, on 
November 17, Sir Edward Grey stated that the reductions in 
naval construction proposed by Geimany were not of sufficient 
financial benefit to Britain. If the entire German program 
was to remain intact, with but a small chance of real re­
duction at an unspecified time in the future, then Britain 
must answer the pressure of German armaments by renewed 
expansion, whatever the cost. In view of the impending
5TP, G. P.. XXVIII, #10358, p.265.
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elections, he thought it wise to suspend negotiations for
a time.58
The question is: what caused the sudden change in the
official attitude of the British government? Sir Charles 
Hardinge and Sir Byre Crowe, permanent employees of the 
Foreign Office, claimed that the Chancellor’s last state­
ments had finally exposed the whole unsavoury scheme, which 
of course could not be a c c e p t e d .59 Great Britain, having 
only one potential enemy, would gain nothing from the 
neutrality agreements, Crowe explained. Furthermore, the 
shipbuilding agreement would tie her hands not only against 
Germany, but against the entire world. These two reasons 
are of course, incompatible, for if îhgland had only one 
probable enemy, then the limitation of that enemy’s naval 
construction was quite sufficient. Much more serious was 
the same limitation for Germany, which admittedly had three 
probable enemies, all of whom were naval powers of importance, 
and all of whom made vast naval increases in the next few 
y e a r s . I t  is unlikely that the British government’s
G. P.. XXVIII, #10365, pp. 273-75.
B. B. D., VI, #204 Foreign Office minutes, pp. 309-12,
^^In this connection it is instructive to compare the 
number of Dreadnoughts building or completed from 1907 to 
1914, and the amount spent on new naval construction in the 
same period, for Britain, France, Russia and Geimany, These 
figures are given in Woodward, Great Britain and the German 
Navy, pp. 450-52, and F. N. Neilson, How ïhplomats Make War, 
(#ew York, 1916) p. 146.
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drastic change of attitude was based largely on Bethmann's 
further revelation of Germany's desires in the November 4 
meeting. Bethmann made substantially the same statements on 
October 14 and on November 4. The vague political agreement 
of the first meeting became in the second meeting an equally 
vague and extremely tentative neutrality proposal. The 
British government did not even exercise its option of pro­
posing a formula which was suitable to it, but simply drop­
ped the negotiations in a rather abrupt manner. Nor did it 
intend to re-open the talks immediately after the election; 
in fact, months elapsed before talks were resumed.
Thus, it appears probable that Bethmann and William II 
were substantially justified in their fears concerning the 
impact of the elections. When it appeared that the German 
naval concessions were not of a nature that could be exploit­
ed in the elections, the continuation of talks became a 
handicap for the Liberal government. Bethmann may have 
made a very wise decision in refusing to negotiate a naval 
construction limitation without a political agreement. One 
can imagine the internal reaction in Germany if the British 
press had been able to exploit a German naval limitation in 
the election campaign. Nor would it have required a breach 
of faith on the part of the British negotiators to make 
such information public, since a leak to the press had been 
established some time ago, and its source had not been
33.
discovered.
It can be objected that Bethmann gave the scope of the 
political agreement away too soon, that he should have pro­
crastinated until conditions became more favorable. But was 
it possible to continue talking in vague generalities without 
making it obvious that only delay was intended? Would the 
British government not have been far more justified in 
breaking off negotiations if it appeared that Bethmann was 
not acting in good faith? In view of the suddenly awakened 
British desire to negotiate, the Chancellor could not risk 
wrecking the negotiations by compromising his reputation of 
sincerity. This way, at least, the prospect of renewed 
talks after the election remained in sight.
During the negotiations, the Chancellor maintained an 
optimistic attitude; since the temporary halt seemed justi­
fied by the British elections, this fact alone did not alter 
his disposition. But during the pause in negotiations, the 
optimism gradually disappeared; Bethmann never regained 
the positive attitude which he brought to these first efforts 
at an understanding.^^ Early in February, he doubted that 
the Liberal cabinet could still be interested in Anglo- 
German talks. The need for overwhelming naval supremacy
G, P,, XXVIII, #10358, 10364, pp. 265, 271-72. 
42lbid., XXVIII, 10369, pp. 282-84.
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had become an election topic. Present cabinet ministers 
had underscored that need during the campaign. Bethmann 
felt that public opinion would preclude a resumption of 
talks on a reasonable basis.
To add to the troubles of diplomacy, Bethmann now had 
two unpredictable Imperial visits to Great Britain to worry 
about. In March, 1910, Prince Henry, on a "private" visit, 
gave public expression to his conviction that a German 
naval limitation was impossible. But this should not alarm 
Great Britain, for in the near future, the two navies would 
fight side by side against the "yellow p e r i l . ( T h i s  he 
said to the only European ally of Japan!) Mettemich, of 
course, reported this to Bethmann, who replied that he had 
specifically begged the Prince to avoid all political state­
ments during his visit. Now he, the ardent royalist, had 
to disavow the public statements of an Imperial Prince!
He instructed Mettemich to explain in London that Prince 
Henry was generally not in touch with politics, and that, 
he had apparently no knowledge of the official German at­
titude toward Anglo-German negotiations.^^ On the other 
hand, the Emperor's visit on the occasion of hie uncle King 
Edward's funeral progressed with unexpected smoothness. 
William II managed to confine his comments pretty well to
43lbid., XXVIII, #10375, pp. 301-4. 
44ibid.. XXVIII, #10377, pp. 307-8.
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expressions of sympathy. These, delivered with his uncommon
theatrical talent, produced some spontaneous demonstrations
of goodwill toward Germany.
While the naval question lay dormant. Sir Edward Grey
made an effort to raise other issues for discussion. He
proposed talks on the Bagdhad Railway question, on the issue
of Persian trade, and on "his favorite point," an exchange
of naval information. With regard to the latter, he felt
that a clear knowledge of the other side's armaments would
45do much to dispel unreasonable fears in both countries. 
Bethmann hoped to utilise this opportunity to pursue his 
original goal of a political agreement. He could not grant 
a concession on the Bagdhad Railway, for the building of 
which German companies had obtained the right-of-way from 
Turkey, without a quid-pro-quo with which to justify such a 
step in Germany. The concession which Grey offered, a re­
moval of British objections to the proposed four-percent 
increase in Turkish customs duties, fell far short of what 
was needed. That was, after all, a concession to Turkey, 
not to Germany. Both the Bagdhad Railway question and the
"open door" in Persia could be included in a general political 
4-6understanding.
45B. D. P ., VI, #337, p. 442. D. G. P.. XXVIII, 
#10382, pp. 315-14.
46b . D. P .. VI, #345-44, pp. 451-59.
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The permanent Foreign Office staff in Great Britain 
made short work of Bethmann's offer. They fastened their 
attention on the neutrality clause of the political agree­
ment, which was identical to the one they had rejected a 
short time before. In their interpretation, they were being 
asked to promise Germany a free hand, in other words, hegemony 
on the continent.Though this interpretation is very 
questionable, it must be admitted that Bethmann made a mis­
take in returning to the rejected plan so soon. In his 
tiresome insistence on this political understanding, he lost 
sight of the fact that a successful negotiation, of whatever 
useless or minor character, can have profound effects on 
diplomatic relations. At this point, a nominal success could 
have opened the way to his coveted political understanding.
The Chancellor’s reply, said Grey, left no further basis 
for negotiation with Germany.^®
As it turned out, this was not the case, for the main 
negotiations, which had been dropped more than six months 
previous, received an unexpected impetus from a speech by 
Prime Minister Herbert Henry Asquith. The speech summariz­
ed the previous year’s negotiations in a manner to which 
Bethmann took exception. The British reply to the German 
complaint incidentally hinted at a resumption of negotia-
4^Ibid., VI, #344, Foreign Office minutes. Comments by Sir Eyre Crowe pp. 459-60.
48lbid., VI, #345, p. 461.
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49tions, and the Chancellor decided to take up the hint.
The resulting talks, however, were of a nature to exclude 
any possibility of agreement or benefit. On September 14, 
1910, Bethmann gave official notice of the completion of his 
reply, which he intended to communicate verbally to Sir 
Edward Goschen. The latter was not in any hurry to receive 
the communication, and to Bethmann's great annoyance, he 
waited a month before making his appearance.^® In his 
reply, Bethmann stated that he had no objection to an ex­
change of naval information, though he personally consider­
ed this of little value. If, however, he was to promise 
not to expand the present navy bill, he must have an equi­
valent concession from Britain, probably in the area of gen­
eral p o l i c y . T h e  political agreement still held a central 
position in his thought !
This communication produced a remarkable series of 
charges and countercharges, which illustrated the state of 
nerves on both sides. Bethmann and the German Foreign 
Office saw fit to include various general and specific 
charges against Great Britain's recent policies toward
49lbid., VI, #387, pp. 501-2.
5®P. G. B., XXVIII, #10443, pp. 411-14. It is interest­
ing to noie that Gooch apparently considers Bethmann respon-i 
sible for the delay. He mentions only that the Chancellor tcjiok 
a long time to consider the British proposal. G. P. Gooch, 
Before the War— II, Studies in Diplomacy. (London, 1938) p. 209.
51p. G. P.. XXVIII, #10416-17, pp. 367-73.
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Germany. The British Foreign Office refuted the charges,
but was particularly incensed by an alleged statement that
the ministers were themselves responsible for anti-German
52outbursts in Britain. The German government denied that
their dictated statement contained the offending phrase.
Both sides eventually realized that they were about to
accuse each other of deliberate falsification? and they
drew back, although neither party was satisfied.
Under the circumstances it is a tribute to the goodwill
of Grey and Bethmann that negotiations continued at all.
Still, a pause was desirable, and a new British election
offered a good pretext. Following this election, the British
government formally proposed a scheme for the exchange of
54.naval information. At the same time, Sir Edward Grey, in 
a speech in the House of Commons, expressed his belief that 
this matter could be settled in the near future. He also 
believed that Germany might be induced to promise not to
52B. B. P., VI, #414, pp. 546-48.
S^Documents in D. G. P. support the German contention 
that the German statement was incorrectly reported. The 
B. D. D. support the British contention that the German 
Foreign Office changed the draft of the dictated memorandum 
following British protests. C. W. Bolen and B, L. Woodward agree with this version which, on balance, seems the more 
likely one. Both authors place the responsibility (alleged) 
on Kiderlen, not on Bethmann. C. W. Bolen, "Kiderlen's Policy 
in Naval Conversations,” Journal of Central European Affairs,
(July, 1949) p. 142, and Ë.' 1. Woodward, Great Britain and'
the German Navy, pp. 288-91•
54p. G. P.. XXVIII, #10429, pp. 390-91.
39.
increase her present naval program.Bethmann turned the 
proposal over to Admiral Tirpitz, who suggested minor changes 
to insure a simultaneous exchange of plans. With this change, 
Bethmann declared himself ready to accept the proposal.
The British accepted the change, and held out the possibility 
of extending the talks to cover a "political agreement" as 
a concession to Bethmann's desire, but only on the Bagdhad 
Railway and Persian trade questions.
This brought Bethmann further exasperation. Under the 
guise of a political agreement, he was asked once again to 
negotiate strictly on questions in which Geimiany should 
make the major concessions! Germany, which had the con­
cession for the Bagdhad Railway, was to relinquish the most 
profitable part of it with little compensation. Germany, 
which had the status of "most favoured nation" in Persian 
trade, was to place limitations on this status. Further­
more, the Chancellor suspected that the secrecy of negotia­
tions had been broken; Goschen had inadvertently mentioned 
that Prance and Russia were told of the negotiations for the
55ibid., Tirpitz took the Chancellor to task, after the 
war, for failing to react more positively to this speech, 
which he interpreted as a concession to the German proposal 
of a three-to-two standard of construction. Actually, the 
speech was merely an answer to inevitable questions in the 
Commons, of which Bethmann had been informed beforehand. 
Tirpitz, Aufbau, II, p. 189. D. G. P., XXVIII, #10433, 
10435, pp. 395, 398.
56ibid., ZXTTTI, #10438, p. 402.
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information exchange, but when Bethmann pressed him on the
exact extent of the information that had been given, the
57Ambassador gave only evasive answers.
By this time the Chancellor entertained little hope 
that these negotiations would bring success. In a memor­
andum to Mettemich, he expressed his growing impatience 
with British procedure in the various t a l k s . T h e i r  pro­
crastination had cost so much time that a retardation of 
the navy program was now no longer possible. Nor was it 
desirable, since British and French naval increases had 
created an entirely new situation. Herewith the only 
common basis for the t^lks had disappeared; he did not 
believe Great Britain could suggest a new basis. Their 
efforts to negotiate separately on the Bagdhad Railway and 
Persian trade questions were not steps in the right direction. 
The rapid progress on the naval information question impressed
him not at all, for he had always considered such an agree-
59ment to be useless. If its intention was to dispel public
5 ? i b i d ., XXVIII, #10438, 10439, pp. 402-3, Anlage.
The suspicion was well founded. Russia and France were 
informed of the extent of these and of previous negotiations,
G. P., XXVIII, #10433, p. 395.
59The notion that such a step could prevent each party 
from "stealing a march" on the other party by secret buildup 
is rather absurd. In early 20th century Europe, it was by 
no stretch of the imagination possible to build a battleship 
secretly.
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fear, then only Great Britain could benefit, for in Grermany 
there was no fear of the British naval expansion. The 
British had repeatedly assured him that the Entente had no 
anti-German intentions, that therefore a political agreement 
was unnecessary. Yet they refused to believe his assurances 
that the German navy had not been built against Britain, but 
only for the protection of German shores and German trade.
The later history of the naval information talks under­
lined the futility of these negotiations. When Germany had
tentatively accepted the last English draft, the Agadir
1crisis intervened. The British answer was therefore de­
layed for months. During this delay, the Foreign Office 
found fault with the provision that details should be ar­
ranged by the Admiralties. Thus, their long-delayed answer
62contained further changes, which would require more talks.
The proposal simply disappeared from the diplomatic scene.
The most striking aspect of Bethmann’s diplomatic 
efforts during his first attempt at a detente with Great 
Britain is the fact that his basic position remained the 
same from beginning to end. For him, the main fact of inter^ 
national relations was Germany’s "encirclement.” To break
60p. G. P.. XXVIII, #10445, p. 395.
Gllbid., XXVIII, #10453, p. 424.
62•B. D. P., VI, #472, p. 461. (Memorandum by Sir Eyre 
Crowe.)
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this encirclement, and thereby to dispel the danger of war, 
British friendship was vital. He regarded as sheer lunacy 
any thought of naval limitation in relation to Great Britain 
when that country continued to support the two countries 
which were diplomatically opposed to Germany and which could 
in the meantime increase their naval armaments at will. 
Therefore, a political settlement with Great Britain was 
absolutely essential. If such a settlement became a reality, 
British fear of the justified German naval expansion would 
disappear. After all. Great Britain was not at all alarmed 
by the expansion of the American fleet. Obviously, an Anglo- 
German political agreement was the key to Germany’s (and 
Europe’s) diplomatic dilemma.
The Chancellor’s summary of the situation was realistic, 
and formally correct. His goodwill and his dedication to 
his task were unquestioned. But his procedure in putting 
his convictions into practice in a diplomatic situation left 
much to be desired. He made no concessions to the fact that 
British policy depended to a considerable degree on public 
o p i n i o n . H e  was convinced that British friendship could be
^It is ironic that Bethmann clearly understood the in­
fluence of public opinion in Britain, although he failed, in 
general, to adjust his diplomacy accordingly. Concerning the 
elections in January 1910, he states, ”0n the one hand, the 
need for an overwhelming naval superiority was so emphasized 
during the election— even lloyd George and Grey spoke in that, 
sense— that it seems doubtful it the Liberal cabinet, which 
knows the limits within which we can meet, it in the naval 
question, can, in the face of public opinion, let itself get
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assured only by treaty, in a formal manner. It did not 
occur to him that this friendship could be cultivated by a 
careful cultivation of public opinion. Useless or meaning­
less agreements, ostentatiously concluded, could have done 
much to achieve this. But Bethmann always had in mind the 
one treaty which could be a panacea for all ills.
Of Bethmann*s ventures into the field of diplomacy, his 
first attempt at an Anglo-German friendship was probably the 
one in which he was most directly involved, to which he gave 
the most personal attention. Though he depended on his 
Foreign Secretary a great deal, especially on Kiderlen when 
he came to the office, it is certain that the direction of 
policy was Bethmann’s, not Kiderlen's, as the letter's 
biographer, Jaeckh, maintains. The Chancellor has generally 
been described as a weak, vacillating, dependent individual. 
Of these characteristics there is little evidence in this 
part of his diplomacy. But he is also described as being 
completely unadaptable, and this characteristic is illustra­
ted to perfection in the Anglo-German negotiations from 1909 
to 1911.
involved in an agreement which we could accept....We also 
must make allowances for the precarious position of the 
liberal government," (D. G. P., XX7III, #10369, pp. 282-84.) 
Yet he did not follow his own advice. His conclusion was 
that, in view of the state of British public opinion, a 
political agreement was all the more vital.
CHAPTER II
, THE AGADIR "COUP” AED AEGLO-GERMAB RELATIONS
When, in 1908, Chancellor Buelow had attempted to re­
dress what he considered Germany’s increasingly dangerous 
international position, an important part of his efforts 
consisted of a planned detente with Prance. In Pranco- 
German relations, the Morocco question was the problem 
which seemed to admit solution; for Germany, very important 
results could be expected from a reasonable adjustment of 
that question. In every dispute with Prance over Morocco, 
the European powers had supported Prance and had left Germany 
virtually isolated. Por that reason alone, an adjustment of 
the problem was desireable; but the German Ambassador in 
Great Britain furnished another reason; if Germany desired 
British friendship as Buelow claimed, then she must improve 
her relations with Prance. This was a precondition for an 
for an approach to Great Britain,^
The Pranco-German adjustment of the Morocco question
In April 1904, Great Britain and Prance had signed and 
published a "Declaration" which was, in fact, an alliance, 
although it did not provide for definite military co-opera­
tion. The agreement settled a number of colonial disputes 
and recognized Morocco as a Prench sphere of influence. The 
German Foreign Office thus knew of the Anglo-Prench Morocco 
connection, though they did not fully realize its extent, 
for the declaration included a secret clause providing for 
an extention of Prench authority in the event of the Sultan’s 
collapse.
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took the form of a treaty, signed at Casablanca in February 
2of 1909. Germany recognized France's special political 
interests in Morocco. France, on the other hand, re-affirmed 
the principle or the "open door" in matters of commerce, and 
specifically undertook not to place obstacles in the way of 
German commerce in that country. The two parties re-affirmed 
the Act of Algeciras and the integrity and independence of 
the "Shereefian Eapire."
Though the agreement caused a great deal of public re­
joicing at the outset, it contained basic weaknesses which 
rendered its permanent success very doubtful.^ Its clauses 
were extremely vague and admitted of many conflicting inter­
pretations. To what degree did it recognize France's special 
political interests? How could such interests be reconciled 
with the declared independence and territorial integrity of 
Morocco? Was France obligated to assure concessions for 
German commerce, must she support German attempts to gain 
such concessions, or did she merely have to avoid active 
opposition to them? What was the economic position of the 
other powers? To these questions the treaty provided no 
specific answers, and it was thus unlikely that it could
^D. G. P., XXIV, i^410, pp. 379-81. For Germany's 
reasons for concluding the Morocco agreement with France, 
#8424, 8476, 8499, pp. 395, 369-73, 494-98.
^Ima C. Barlow, The Agadir Crisis. (Chapel Hill, 1940) 
pp. 77-79.
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produce the expected thaw in Franco-German relations.
Indeed, from the beginning, the two countries mistrusted 
each other’s intention. Germany expected France to subvert 
the independence of Morocco, to attempt to gain a protector­
ate over the country; France refused to believe in Germany’s 
political and territorial disinterest,
Bethmann Hollweg personally made every effort to live 
up to Germany's ill-defined promises. In December 1909» he 
delivered a conciliatory speech in the Reichstag, comment­
ing on the improvement in Franco-German relations as a 
result of the Casablanca treaty.^ Just two days after this 
date, the Sultan, evidently feeling French political pres­
sure, offered Germany a coaling station on Morocco’s Atlan­
tic coast, with the explanation that such a step could help 
him to resist the growing political incursion of the ’♦Western 
Powers,"5 Bethmann had no desire to be played against 
France for the Sultan’s benefit, and he instructed the 
Foreign Office to inform France of the offer, which should 
be rejected.^ While Bethmann intended to keep the agreement, 
certain commercial concerns and imperially-minded societies 
in Germany certainly had other intentions.
In February 1910 the French government, faced with the
^D. G. P.. XXIX, #10492, p. 39» editors' footnote. 
Sibid., XXIX, #10488, p. 37.
^Ibid.. XXIX, #10489» pp. 37-40, editors’ footnote.
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Sultan's refusal to accept the conditions of the French loan 
which should help him to meet his international obligations, 
decided to apply diplomatic pressure to assure acceptance 
of the loan's terras. The pressure was to take the form of 
a withdrawal of diplomatic representatives from the Sultan's 
capital. Again, Bethmann advised cooperation with France; 
he explained that Germany had no political interest and 
would consequently make no difficulties if France thought
7such a step advisable. On March 10, Bethmann moved against 
the demands of commercial interests; he stated unequivocal­
ly that his government would not go beyond its international
obligations to secure economic benefits for concerns like
8Mannesmann Bros.
Despite the Chancellor's goodwill, it soon appeared 
that the Franco-German Casablanca agreement, far from 
liquidating the Moroccan problem, had actually aggravated 
it. Berman commercial interests besieged the Foreign Office 
with complaints that the French were violating the "open 
door" clause. Mannesmann Bros,, unable to secure the co­
operation of the German government for a protectorate scheme
^Ibid., m x ,  #10501, p, 46,
QBarlow, Agadir, p. 137. Sultan Mulay Hafid had grant­
ed the firm of Mannesman Bros, extensive mining concessions 
in South Moroccol The French government questioned the 
validity of these concessions on the basis of the Act of 
Algeciras, and the German government concurred with the Frenoh 
view, Mannesmann Bros, obtained extensive support from Germ^ 
public opinion, and insisted that the Government support the|r 
claim. Bethmann and Kiderlen consistently refused such support.
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in south-west Morocco, combined forces with the Pan-German 
League to buy or influence newspapers for the purpose of 
converting public opinion to an acceptance of German politi­
cal adventures in the area of their i n t e r e s t .  ̂ Meanwhile, 
French penetration, which should have been expected to a 
degree from the terms of the Casablanca agreement, proceed­
ed to turn Morocco into a virtual French protectorate.
Sultan Mulay Hafid endeavoured to shore up Morocco's finances, 
but became increasingly entangled in financial obligations 
to F r a n c e . S i n c e  this made him very unpopular, French 
authorities soon had to protect him and his officials from 
the Moroccan people. The very vocal French militarist and 
expansionist circles regarded this as a great opportunity. 
Their ardor at times produced surprising indiscretions; 
for example, a colonial official, in a public New Year's 
address, told his countrymen that Morocco was well on the
way to becoming French, that France would soon exercise 
11sovereignty. Throughout 1910, German representatives 
reported a series of small French military advances and a
Q Otto Hamman, The World Policy of Germany 1890-1912. 
(New York, 1927) pp. È2Ù-21. Barlow. Agadir, pp. 154-35.
^^For example, the question of his French loan in 
February of 1910, the terms of which he accepted only under 
duress. D. G. P., XXIX, #10502, pp. 46-7.
^^Ibid., XXIX, #10493, p. 40. The speech, reported in 
Germany, brought ah official German protest, and a French 
disavowal.
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12consequent spread of French authority. Moreover, every
French advance produced a renewed outburst of unrest in
Morocco, which the French were obliged to quell. Thus,
while French authority extended itself, trade stagnated and
travel became nearly impossible for Europeans because of
the hostility of the populace.
Each French advance, taken singly, was so small and so
plausibly justified that Germany could not make official
protests, but the German government was fully aware that the
spread of French authority, when taken as a whole, was a
violation of both the Act of Algeciras and the Casablanca
Treaty. Under the circumstances, the German government had
to be content with vague expressions of uneasiness. In
diplomatic language, these took the form of expressions of
hope that Prance would not take actions which might increase
13the unrest in Morocco to the further detriment of trade.
This background lends significance to reports from 
the German representative in Tangiers, dated March 1911» 
that there were growing disturbances in the vicinity of the 
Moroccan capital.jfe attributed the unrest to three factors: 
the increased taxation and the attempted strengthening of
IZibid., XXIX, #10498, 10522, pp. 43, 73-74, and others 
in chapters CCXXVI and CCXXVII,
^^Ibfd., XXIX, #10513, pp. 58-59, represents such a 
warning ifrbm Kiderlen to the French government,
l^lbid,, XXIX, #10524, pp, 75-76.
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of govemiaent authority through the formation of a regular 
army were partly responsible. The main factor, however, 
was the recent action of Major Mangin, French commandant of 
the Sultan's troops, who had ordered the public execution 
of two Moslem soldiers for the crime of desertion. Offend­
ed Moslem religious sensibility had actually triggered the 
present disturbances.
The situation brought immediate action from the French 
government which, on the fifth and sixth of April, notified 
Great Britain and Germany that a French military expedition 
to Fez might soon be necessary for the protection of Europeans 
in that city. The notification to Britain more clearly 
revealed French intentions, probably because it was deliver­
ed verbally. In fact, Sir Arthur Nicolson, who received the 
message, gathered that the support of the Sultan was a far 
greater factor than assurance of the safety of Europeans in 
Fez. If that were the case. Sir Arthur feared that this 
military expedition might assume the character of a rather 
extended occupation.
The French communication prompted a more direct warning
from the German Foreign Office."Happily," Kiderlen said,
...the latest news from Fez is of a more favourable 
nature, and it does not appear that there is imminent
ISlbld., XXIX, #10526, pp. 78-79. B. B. P .. VII, 
#202, pp. 186-87.
I^ibid., XXIX, #10527, pp. 79-80.
51.
danger (to European residents)....An expedition such as 
is contemplated by the French government can only pro­
duce further agitation...it is unnecessary to repeat 
the experience of Casablanca.
17Bethmann issued a similar warning to France on April 19.
He told the French Ambassador Jules Gambon that, in his
opinion, the French action could only excite more unrest,
and that the military expedition, once in Fez, would find
it very difficult to withdraw from there. Gambon then
raised this question: in a case of absolute necessity,
could Bethmann refuse permission to rescue the Europeans?”̂®
The Chancellor's answer was determined by the nature of the
question. He could not give a categoric "no" to such a
question, but he urgently hoped that the situation would not
arise. Apparently the French Foreign Office regarded the
Chancellor's statement as a concession; in the French
government's estimate of the situation, the case of "abso-
19lute necessity" happened to arise the very next day.
On April 25, Bethmann made a summary of developments 
20for the Emperor. Reports from Fez, he wrote, continued
I7lbid., XXIX, #10535, pp. 85-86.
^®In a later interview, reported by Sir E. Goschen, 
Gambon claimed that he had held out to Bethmann the example 
of Gladstone, who had tarried in the case of the expedition 
to save Gordon in Khartoum, and who was subsequently blamed 
for Gordon's death. Gambon gave no indication of the Chan­
cellor's reply to this lesson from the pages of history,
B. B. P., VII, #234, pp. 211-212.
G. P.. XXIX, #10537, pp. 86-88.
20lbid., XXIX, #10542, pp. 92-93.
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to be contradictory; French sources painted the situation 
•’black on black," while German and Austrian sources saw 
little danger to Europeans in the city, though they admitted 
that Sultan Mulay Hafid was in trouble. The French press, 
largely supported by the British press, sought to convince 
the French government to advance troops to the city; the 
German press seemed quite reasonable, with the exception of 
Fan-German papers. The French Ambassador had come to 
Bethmann's office repeatedly, and the Chancellor had given 
him to understand that the contemplated expedition could 
bring international complications.
Meanwhile, the conflicting reports and diplomatic 
jockeyings brought to the surface the undercurrent of Anglo- 
German distrust, which was particularly evident in the 
British Foreign Office. From the British Ambassador in 
Austria came a warning that Germany intended to create a 
Franco-Spanish quarrel out of the Moroccan developments,
21and that she had already taken action to achieve this end. 
Sir Byre Crowe and Sir Arthur Nicolson annotated this 
document with the observations that Germany most likely 
intended to create "the maximum mischief," that she would 
then urge upon Britain and Russia a political agreement
21 B. X>, P.. VII, #214, pp. 197-98.
55.ppdesigned to separate the Entente. Other reports from
British ambassadors and from French sources portrayed
Germany as lying in ambush, waiting for France to entangle
herself irredeemably before coming forth to "make trouble"
in some mysterious and dastardly fashion. These reports
all implied that Great Britain should give maximum support 
25to France,
German documents indicate a similar, if less intense 
suspicion of Great Britain. Early in spring, Bethmann re­
ceived two reports of alleged Anglo-French staff talks on
the problems of a British expeditionary force in the event of
24war against Germany. One report, from Ambassador Metter- 
nich, made the point that France might soon demand concrete 
proof from Great Britain that the Entente was still solid.
The Chancellor was aware of the importance of the British 
government's stand on the Morocco question. In June, he 
had occasion to recommend to Admiral Tirpitz a prompt 
acceptance of the British changes in the information exchange
Ibi^., VII, #214, pp. 197-98. At this time, negotia­
tions were in progress over the exchange of naval information 
between Britain and Germany. The Foreign Office had just 
rejected Bethmann*s offers of a neutrality agreement, and 
the place was still abuzz with indignation.
Z^Ibid., VII, #208-11, p.230.
24p. G. P.. XXIX, #10520, 10521, pp. 66-69, 69-70.
The editors' footnote to #10520 gives a surprisingly accurate 
analysis by the German military attache in Britain, Major 
Winterfeldt, of the extent and the problems of a British 
expeditionary force.
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25agreement. The present political situations, he told
Tirpitz, made it very desirable to achieve a positive result
in the Anglo-German talks.
On May 15, the French government gave official notice
in the capitals of Europe that it intended to "relieve" the
26city of Fez with a French military column. The action 
was not unexpected, and the German Foreign Office had 
already planned a move in reply. From the heightened con­
cern of the British and French officials it is obvious 
that they also expected a German reply. Given Germany's 
position in Morocco by virtue of the Casablanca agreement, 
she could not very well continue with vague expressions of
apprehension; the French move demanded a substantial 
27counter-move. In view of this, two incidents take on a 
heightened significance: on May 18, Sir Edward Grey explain­
ed to Mettemich that the British government supported the 
French expedition, and would continue this support even if
OQa lengthy occupation of Fez should prove necessary. A 
week later, the British Ambassador made substantially the
25%bid., XXVIII, #10449, p. 420.
^^Ibid.. XXIX, #10559, pp. 118-19.
27For various expressions of suspicion of or expecta­
tion of German action in reply to a French march to Fez, 
see B, B. D., VII, chapter LII.
28ibid., VII, #278, p. 256. D. G. P., XXIX, #10561, 
p. 119.
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same statement in a conversation with B e t h m a n n . T h e  
Chancellor could have little doubt that Great Britain in­
tended thereby to strengthen the French government's position 
for the expected showdown with Germany, Such an action fit­
ted precisely into Bethmann's concept of the anti-German 
direction of British diplomacy.
Because of the great subtlety of the French penetra­
tion of Morocco, Germany's freedom of action was quite 
limited. She could permit the French march to Fez, making 
it clear that, once the Europeans were no longer in danger, 
France must withdraw from the area. This step would un­
doubtedly produce French assurances that such was indeed 
the government's intention. Then, unavoidable incidents 
could be counted on to delay a withdrawal of troops, and 
Germany would be faced with the same diplomatic situation 
again and again. Public opinion in Germany and foreign
expectation of German action was a guarantee that such pro-
30cedure would be considered a German diplomatic defeat.
Or, Germany could insist on strict enforcement of the Act 
of Algeciras and of the Franco-German understanding. This 
condition was impossible of fulfillment, and insistence 
on it must have led to war. A third alternative was a
29s. D. P., VII, #306, p. 276.
^^Theodor Wolff, The Eve of 1914. (New York, 1936), 
p. 39 gives a good résumé of the tone of public opinion 
in Europe immediately following the French advance.
56.
German surrender of claims in Morocco with adequate compen­
sation for Germany’s commercial interests in that country.
But since there were very few separate instances of French 
penetration of sufficient import to justify strong diplomatic 
action, it was imperative to avoid postponement of a decision 
through vague negotiations.
It is difficult to determine the precise origin of the 
plan to dispatch a warship to the Port of Agadir on Morocco's 
west coast. Even more difficult is it to trace the Chan­
cellor’s personal responsibility for the plan; in this 
instance, Bethmann’s direct role was much smaller than it 
had been in the Anglo-German negotiations.^^ At any rate, 
there is little evidence to support the widely-held assump­
tion that Bethmann disapproved of the plan to dispatch war­
ships. For one thing, it is simply not in keeping with 
the man's character to defend an action which in his opinion
 ̂This is evident in D. G. P., XXIX. If the editors' 
selection of documents is is unbiased, Bethmann produced far 
fewer communications than he had produced on the subject of 
naval negotiations. Kiderlen emerges as the dominant force 
in this volume.
32Wolff cites a short, obscure reference by Kiderlen 
about Bethmann's interference as indicative of the latter's 
displeasure at the proposed dispatch of warships. But it 
is by no means clear what Bethmann disapproved of, and there 
is no reason to assume that it was the idea of the ship 
dispatch. Wolff, Eve, p. 43. E. I. Woodward's few cryptic 
remarks also imply that Bethmann was the unwilling follower 
in this case. Woodward, Great Britain and the German Navy, 
pp. 309-12. G. P. Gooch is oi the same opinion. 6ooch, 
Before the War, II, Studies in Diplomacy and Statecraft, 
p. 2lé.
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could endanger world peace. Then, Bethmann had himself
contemplated the dispatch of warships to Moroccan ports in
the Loan Crisis of 1910, and he had actually approached
33the Emperor with this idea. True, the situation was a 
different one, Bethmann had intended only a protection of 
German citizens, and presumably he would have dispatched 
ships to ports where there actually were such citizens to 
protect; moreover, he took no steps to develop this tenta­
tive suggestion. But it seems very unlikely that he now 
objected to the idea of the ship dispatch as a type of 
"pistol point diplomacy," Nor could he have been much 
impressed by the fact that Agadir was, by the Act of Algecir­
as, a "closed harbour," for he knew that the French had used 
closed harbors for the purpose of troop s u p p l y . T h e  
attempts to dissociate the Chancellor from the decision to 
dispatch the Panther are based on the questionable assumption 
that this was a sinister, saber-rattling move with which a 
man of Betlimann's undoubted integrity could not well be con­
nected, It is easier to portray the Chancellor as a reluctant 
pawn than as a reckless adventurer. Both pictures are equal­
ly distorted by the original assumption about the "Panther *s 
spring,"
On May 3» Kiderlen presented the Chancellor with a
G. P,, XXIX, #10502, pp. 46-47. 
54ibid., XXIX, #10566, pp, 124-27.
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memorandum reviewing the Moroccan situation and the expect- 
ed impact of the Fez expedition. The most important part 
of the memorandum proposed the dispatch of warships to Agadir 
and Mogador with the intention of inducing the French govern­
ment to negotiate on a serious compensation offer. Kiderlen 
wished to grasp this opportunity to solve the dilemma which 
faced German diplomacy in the form of the gradual hut con­
tinuous French advance in Morocco, The fact that Bethmann 
supported this position in an audience with the Emperor is 
sufficient proof that he did not regard the plan as heing 
in any way sinister, and that he gave it his full approval.
But, while the Chancellor was in touch with and approved 
of the broad outlines of the plan, some important details 
were arranged without his knowledge. The aide-memoire 
which was sent to the European capitals on June 30 was based 
on a collective complaint from eleven German firms with in­
terests in the south of Morocco, and this collective com­
plaint was solicited by the Foreign Office, without Bethmann*s 
knowledge, from Dr, Regendanz, managing director of the 
Hamburg-Marokko Gesellschaft.^^ Thus, the occasion and
35lbid., m x , #10549, pp. 101-8.
^^There was, indeed, not a single German to protect at 
Agadir, and Dr. Regendanz even arranged for a German to go 
posthaste from Mogador to be on hand when his protection 
arrived. However, he got there two days after the Panther's 
arrival. For details of the Regendanz arrangements, see
F. W. Pick, "Hew Light on Agadir," The Contemporary Review 
(Sept., 1957), pp. 525-54. The editors of D. G. P. devoted
59.
the ostensible reason for the ship dispatch were arranged
without the Chancellor's previous approval. But, when he
heard of the plan, he gave it his support and helped to
convince the Smperor of its suitability, William II gave
his approval, and Kiderlen set the plan in motion with the
37laconic telegram: "Ships approved."
The attitude of the powers immediately following the
dispatch gave Bethmann no cause to fear a violent reaction.
While the aide-memoire of June 30 had used only the spurious
justification produced by Dr. Regendanz, the Ambassadors
had been instructed to make a verbal explanation mentioning
breaches of the Algeciras Act and Branco-German compensation
t a l k s , O n  July 3, Bethmann wrote to William II that
European public opinion was, on the whole, favorable.
"This is true even of the English press," he stated, "with
39exception of a few conservative papers." Apparently, 
he had expected a more violent outburst from that quarter. 
Bor did the ambassadorial reports indicate any danger 
from Great Britain. Sir Edward Grey only expressed concern 
over the possibility of a settlement among France, Germany,
only a short footnote to the incident, explaining that it 
was merely a matter of the ostensible, not the real reason
for the dispatch of the ship. D. G. P., XXIX, #10576, p.
152, editors' footnote.
G. P.. XXIX, #10576, p . 152.
38lbid., XXIX, #10578, p. 1^3.
59lbid., XXIX, #10587, pp. 163-64.
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and Spain, to the exclusion of British interests. Metter- 
nich assured him that Germany had no such intentions.
Aware of the potential danger from Great Britain,
Bethmann at once sent instructions to his A m b a s s a d o r . ^ 0  
Germany, he was to explain, fully realized that Great 
Britain might need to take similar steps in order to ensure 
consideration of her interests. He added that he inter­
preted Great Britain's concern over her own interests as 
a form of approval of Germany's action, which had been 
taken for precisely analogous reasons. Metternich did 
not get a chance to make this statement, for Sir Edward 
Grey gave official notice of Great Britain's determination 
not be excluded from a Moroccan settlement. Metternich 
therefore confined himself to another assurance that Germany 
did not intend to exclude Great Britain, or to encroach 
upon her "legitimate interests.
While the diplomatic reactions seemed entirely satis­
factory, Bethmann was hard-pressed to avoid a domestic 
crisis over the Branco-German negotiations which the Panther's 
presence at Agadir had set in motion. The Emperor was on a 
northern holiday when he received Bethmann's reports of the 
unhurried procedure of these negotiations. Now he became 
anxious, for he feared that "third parties" would intervene
40lbid., XXIX, #10590, p. 166. 
41lbid., XXIX, #10592, p. 167.
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if negotiations dragged on too long. He was particularly 
worried about England. In footnotes to Bethmann’s reports 
and in a separate telegram, William II voiced his displeasure 
in a lively manner. What annoyed him most was the state­
ment that "energetic bearing" might become necessary to 
achieve results with Prance. "The monarch amuses himselfÎ 
And in the meantime we steer directly for mobilization] 
Without me that must not h a p p e n . H e r e  were the seeds 
of an internal crisis; not only did the Emperor threaten 
to return home to interfere in the delicate negotiations, 
but Kiderlen sent Bethmann his resignation on the grounds
that the Emperor's comments were intended as a censure of
43his proceedings,
Bethmann kept his head, and thereby undoubtedly avert­
ed an internal crisis with serious diplomatic overtones; 
the hasty return of William II coupled with the resignation 
of the foreign Secretary would have been interpreted as a 
German panic. The Chancellor sent William II a soothing 
telegram, explaining that no threats had been made to Prance 
or to any foreign power, and that no such threats would be 
made as long as he headed the government; the Emperor's
42lbid., XXi::, #10600, 10601, 10607, 10608, pp. 177-78, 
184-8 8.
45jaeokh, Kiderlen-Waechter, II, first resignation, 
pp. 128-29, second resignation, pp. 132-34.
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return was therefore not required.Following this, he 
sent off a lengthy explanation in which he defended Kider­
len ’s handling of the situation as based on mandates given
4-5by William II himself. Meanwhile, he held Kiderlen off 
by sending him a copy of the same statement with the ex­
planation that his policy had the Chancellor's full support. 
He asked him not to take further steps until he had dis­
cussed the matter with him personally.This delaying 
action worked; three days later William II gave permission 
to carry on negotiations on the "lines previously agreed 
upon," thus removing all cause for Kiderlen's resignation.
Diplomatically, things were deceptively quiet after 
the initial ripple caused by the Panther's dispatch. 
Certainly, no indication of British displeasure came to 
Bethmann's attention before July 20. During an interval 
of twenty days from the Panther's dispatch to the outbreak
of the Anglo-German crisis, the British Ambassador made
47only one appearance at the German Foreign Office. On 
that occasion, Kiderlen gave him yet another assurance that
44p. G. P.. XXIX, #10611, pp. 189-90.
46.
45ibid., XXIX, #10615, pp. 191-95.
Jaeckh, Kiderlen-Waechter, II, p. 131.
4?B. D. D., VII, #322-77, pp. 289-359. Goschen's 
visit, #373, p. 356. Goschen gave as reason for his visit, 
"^ome minor matter."
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Germany did not wish to negotiate with Prance and Spain to 
the exclusion of Great Britain, Bethmann hoped that the re­
fusal to permit Spanish participation in the Pranco-German 
negotiations would lend credibility to this assurance.
On July 20 came the first hint of a change in Britain’s 
apparent quiescence. Metternich reported on an article in 
the Times, in which alleged German territorial demands were
/ Q
outlined on a map of the Congo area of Africa. The article
stressed the British interests involved in the area and the
immense size of the German ’’demand.” In view of this, the
writer doubted if the demand had been made with serious
intentions to negotiate; it seemed more likely that Germany
wished to bring about a French rejection, in which case
she would claim territory in the vicinity of Agadir. The
following day, Metternich reported a meeting with Sir Edward
Grey in which the Foreign Secretary voiced fears which were
49very similar to those expressed in the Times article.
Grey could not go so far as to accuse Germany of deliberate­
ly making impossible demands, but Metternich reported him 
saying essentially that, in diplomatic language:
48p. G. P.. XXIX, #10616, p.198.
49lbid., XXIX, #10617, pp. 199-203. For Sir Edward 
Grey’s version of the conversation, which is essentially 
the same as that here reported, see B. D. D., VII, #411, 
pp. 390-91.
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Since Prance obviously could not grant the cession of 
French Congo territory to the Sangha River, including 
French purchase options on the Belgian Congo, it seemed 
likely that the talks would return to the Moroccan terri­
tory, where there were strong British interests. Con­
sequently, the question of German intentions in Agadir 
arose again.
It is unlikely that Bethmann was unduly disturbed by this
report; he knew that Grey's fears were groundless, that
Germany desired no territory in Morocco. Since Mettemich
had asked for instructions, Bethmann could assume that no
drastic action would be taken in Great Britain until the
German reply was known,
long before Metternich received the instructions of
his government, Lloyd George, Chancellor of the Exchequer,
made his Mansion House speech, which turned the delicate
50diplomatic situation into an Anglo-German crisis. The 
offending passage was verycbscurely worded, but the situa­
tion then prevailing made it applicable only to one nation:
If a situation were to be forced upon us in which 
peace could only be preserved by the surrender of the 
great and beneficent position Britain has won by cen­
turies of effort and achievement, by allowing Britain 
to be treated where her interests are vitally affected 
as if she were of no account in the cabinet of nations, 
then I say emphatically that peace at that price would 
be a humiliation intolerable for a great nation like 
ours to endure.
The intention of the speech is not obvious. Sir Edward
Grey had already indicated his concern over the fact that
the German government had not chosen to reveal its intention
50Ibid., VII, #411, p. 391.
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and official position more clearly; in view of the impend­
ing discussion of foreign policy in the House of Commons,
Grey needed specific information on German activities and
51designs in Agadir and southern Morocco. Presumably, this 
was the reason for his talk with Metternich on July 21, If 
this also explains the warning contained in the Mansion 
House speech, if that speech was only a demand for more 
complete information, then the diplomacy of Sir Edward Grey 
was in this instance dangerously inconsistent. On the other 
hand, the French government had just indicated its need for 
diplomatic support; the French found it difficult to under­
stand Great Britain's silence, and doubted the solidarity
52of the Entente. As dear as the Entente was to the Foreign
Office staff, it is still hard to believe that the Mansion
House speech was Sir Edward Grey’s answer to that French
plea. After all, such important aspects of diplomacy are
not decided on in the casual manner in which Lloyd George's
55speech was approved. Probably Gooch comes closest to an 
answer, that Sir Edward Grey simply did not realize the
Sllbid., 711, #399, p. 377.
52lbid., VII, #408-9, pp. 385-86.
55Viscount Grey of Fallodon, Twenty-Five Years 1892-1916. 
In his memoirs, page 225-26, Grey made the surprisingly 
naive comment that the speech had done much to prevent a war 
in 1911. It is almost certain that such was not its intention; 
it is certain that such was not its effect.
66.
explosive nature of such a statement in that diplomatic 
54-setting. In this light, the speech appears as a diplomatic 
blunder which, because of reactions from the press and public 
opinion, could not be disavowed or mitigated with explana­
tory statements.
Some time after the event, in a Reichstag speech of 
November 9, Bethmann claimed that it was not the speech itself 
which was significant, but the subsequent jingoistic interpre­
tation of it by the European press which the British govern­
ment made no move to disavow, so that it was generally assumed
55to be the official one. The Chancellor continued;
I found myself constrained to instruct the Imperial 
Ambassador in London to speak about the matter. My 
representation was to the effect that we were discussing 
the Morocco question with France; that England's in­
terests were not so far affected thereby; and that if 
îhgland should consider her interests to be affected by 
the discussions, we expected the British government to 
urge those interests upon the two contracting govern­
ments only through the usual diplomatic channels.
In this version of Bethmann's position during the Mansion 
House crisis, it appears as if he was himself responsible 
for the sharp German protest delivered by Metternich on 
July 25. But the Ambassador's instruction had Kiderlen's 
signature, and was clearly in his style. Since the Secre­
tary had been left in complete control of Franco-German
^^Gooch, Befoie the War, II, p. 75. See also Winston 
Churchill, The World Crisis, 1911-1918. (London, 1932) I, 
pp. 93-98.
55B. D. P.. VII, #673-74, pp. 664-75.
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negotiations following the Panther's dispatch, he was pro­
bably the real author of the protest; Bethmann's part may 
have been limited to one of official consent. The German 
government's failure to exploit this strong protest to dis­
prove the charges of weakness made by its domestic critics 
can, on the other hand, be attributed to Bethmann, since 
he was particularly concerned with domestic politics and with 
British reactions. Friedrich Thimme made the very plausible 
suggestion that the Chancellor intentionally avoided such a
use of the protest in order to prevent further deteriora-
57tion of Anglo-German relations. Throughout the crisis, 
Bethmann endeavored to keep anti-British feeling at a minimum, 
He considered the newspapers largely responsible for the im­
pact of the Lloyd George speech, and in the Reichstag on 
November 9, he made a definite accusation against the Euro­
pean press. The Reichstag members themselves received a 
similar lecture; the language which had been used was un­
suitable in a "Parliament conscious of responsibility." 
Turning directly to the prominent conservative Heydebrandt, 
Bethmann remarked that a strong man does not "carry his
5 The majority of secondary sources attributes the 
protest to Kiderlen, Jaeckh, Kiderlen-Waechter, II, p. 135* 
Barlow, Agadir. p. 309. Gooch, Before the War, II, p. 221. 
Priedrich Thimme, Bethmann Hollweg's Kriegsreden, (Stuttgart, 
1919), XIX.
Thimme, Kriegsreden, XIX.
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sword in his m o u t h . H e  obviously had no intention of 
permitting jingoistic public opinion to dictate his foreign 
policy. Not even the Imperial family could escape his cen­
sure. The Crown Prince had ostentatiously applauded a par­
ticularly fire-eating Reichstag speech, and this earned him 
a reprimand from the Chancellor in the presence of William II.^ 
To the Emperor's military mentality, troop and fleet move­
ments represented the essence of a crisis, a fact which 
Bethmann knew very well. He answered his monarch's anxious 
queries about British fleet concentrations with what appears 
today somewhat exaggerated condidence: Sir Edward Grey had
denied any connection between the crisis and fleet movements, 
and he found no reason to doubt the Foreign Secretary's 
word!
Bethmann showed more concern over the progress of 
Kiderlen's negotiations with France. Evidently, the letter's 
procedures aroused his anxiety to such a degree that he went 
to question him on July 28. The following day, Kiderlen 
accompanied the Chancellor to an audience with William II; 
on that journey, Bethmann's fears were dispelled, and he 
left Kiderlen a free hand in the talks with France. Follow­
ing this interview, he never doubted the peaceful conclusion
SGp. D. P.. VII. #673-74, 677, pp. 664-65, 679-81.
59H. G. Zmarzlik, Bethmann Hollweg als Reichskanzler,
p. 37.
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of the whole affair. Anglo-German, incidents were by no 
means over, but both the Cartwright "interview" and the 
Faber disclosures brought only routine inquiries from the 
Chancellor as to the British government's stand; they pro­
duced no diplomatic crises, although they brought further 
anti-British agitation in the German press.
In view of Bethmann*s undoubtedly sincere desire to 
create an Anglo-German understanding, how can his approval 
of the Agadir "coup" be justified? Does this represent an 
incomprehensible anomaly in Bethmann's long-range diplomatic 
plans, as Theodor Wolff claims?^"' The Chancellor's own 
explanation after the event placed the development of the 
second Morocco crisis in an entirely different light.
On August 25, an article in the Neue Freie Presse 
of Vienna contained charges against Germany's Morocco diplo- 
macy. îhe article was popularly attributed to the British 
Ambassador in Austria, Sir Fairfax Cartwright. The Chancellor's 
query to England brought, at first, only an unsatisfactory 
explanation. After further exchanges, the British and German 
governments worked out a statement which closed the question 
for purposes of diplomacy, but it continued to produce heated 
press exchanges. D. G. F,, XXIX, #10645-9» pp. 237-44.
On November 1?, Captain Faber, in a speech at indover, 
disclosed alleged British naval preparations during the crisis. 
According to the Captain, British ships had been given instruc­
tions to repel with fire the approach of German ships. Grey  ̂
made only a weak denial of the allegation, which did not satis­
fy Bethmann, but he thought it wise not to press the matter 
further. Ibid., XXIX, #10657, pp. 261-66 and editors' foot­
note, #106^7"pp. 271-72.
Theodor Wolff, The Eve of 1914. (New York, 1956), p. 2^.
G^B. D. P .. VII, #674, pp. 665-76.
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’’Morocco," he said in November 1911,
was like a continually festering wound in our relations 
not only with Prance but also with England....I would 
say one more word thereto. In virtue of treaty stipula­
tions, England stood ever on the side of Prance. Our 
understanding with Prance accordingly also cleans the 
slate between us and England.
After the war, he gave this explanation for the decision to
dispatch the Panther:
he (Kiderlen) came to the conclusion that Prance would 
not even be brought to negotiate except by drastic means. 
That is how the dispatch of the Panther to Agadir came 
about....It was a defensive rejoinder to an aggressive 
act.
The important question in this connection is: did Bethmann
realize that Great Britain would support Prance when he gave 
permission for the Panther’s dispatch to Agadir? The question 
cannot be answered with a direct quote from the Chancellor's 
statements, but the evidence indicates that he fully expect­
ed it. Kiderlen had no illusions about British neutrality 
in the a f f a i r . A  memorandum from the hand of Zimmermann, 
Under-Secretary in the Poreign Office, expressly stated that 
British support of Prance was to be expected. Bethmann used 
this memorandum as a basis for his last audience with the 
Emperor before the dispatch of the ship to Agadir. There­
after, Bethmann gave particular attention to press and govern­
ment reaction in Great Britain. It is safe to assume that he
^^Theobald von Bethmann Hollweg, Reflections on the World 
War. (London, 1919), p. 32.
G. P., XXIX, #10549, pp. 101-8, editors' footnote.
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expected Great Britain to give Prance diplomatic support.
This would, moreover, fit very well into his general concep­
tion of the British role in Germany's diplomatic isolation.
The crisis came, in Bethmann's opinion, not because of 
British support of Prance, but because of the unorthodox 
nature of that support. The press reaction to the Mansion 
House speech brought the crisis, not the Panther's appearance 
at Agadir.
The press campaign had a profound effect on German 
public opinion. The negotiations were Pranco-German, yet 
the crisis was an Anglo-German one! To the public, this 
was additional evidence that Germany's real enemy was not 
Prance, but Great B r i t a i n . T h e  crisis had a similar effect 
on Bethmann; for him, the entire history of the Moroccan 
affair provided an illustration of his basic diplomatic as­
sumption: that, everywhere in the world, Germany would
find Great Britain in active diplomatic opposition, in solid 
front with her Entente partners. On November 28, 1911» he 
wrote to William II about Sir Edward Grey's speech in 
parliament.
(it) begins with a lengthy attempt to indict us for the 
acknowledged (British) suspicion against us. The specific
^^E. M. Carrol, Germany and the Great Powers. (New York, 
1938), pp. 696-99.
G&P. G. P.. XXIX, #10661, pp. 271-72. For Sir Edward 
Grey's speech, B. D, D.. VII, #721, pp. 725-35.
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facts quoted for this purpose are in some cases inaccurate, 
in other cases presented in a biased light. Although the 
well-known expression, that England followed our negotia­
tions with goodwill, recurs a number of times, Grey still 
admits such an open support of the French case that a 
furthering of negotiations thereby is out of the question. 
Moreover, the speech contains the admission that England 
supported France even in areas where British interests 
were not at all in question.
The clue to the lesson Bethmann drew from the crisis is 
the phrase "supported France even in areas where British 
interests were not at all in question." This analysis deep­
ened the Chancellor's inherent pessimism and prompted him to 
take two steps in response. One step was a vigorous support 
for the proposed increases to the German army. He felt that 
Germany's diplomatic position held such dangers of war that 
he could not be responsible for a failure to make adequate 
preparations for the country's s a f e t y . A t  the same time, 
he still adhered to his plan for an eventual Anglo-German 
understanding, and he: refused to ,)eopardize the chances for 
such an understanding by a further increase in the German 
navy. The other step which devolved from the Agadir crisis 
was a renewed effort at improvement of Anglo-German relations. 
The legacy of Agadir played an important part in the failure 
of that effort. Bethmann made the most determined political 
stand of his career in an attempt to prevent further in­
creases to the German navy, but the anti-British tone of 
public opinion defeated him.
^^Thimme, Kriegsreden, XX.
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The Chancellor’s procedures during the Haldane mission 
provided an interesting sequel to the Agadir crisis. During 
the crisis, Kiderlen had practically a free hand in diplo­
macy; the Chancellor worked behind the scenes and generally 
supported his Secretary. But Kiderlen found himself prac­
tically excluded from participation in the Haldane talks. 
Could it be that the Kaiser’s prediction had come true, that 
Bethmann finally found Kidhrlen’s methods to be too abrupt? 
Bethmann does not answer this question in his memoirs.
CHAPTER III
BETHMAM AND THE HAIDANE MISSION
How did the 19II Morocco crisis affect Germany's 
diplomatic situation? In the German government, we find 
again the two competing interpretations. The Chancellor and 
the Poreign Office defended the view that Germany had clear­
ed an obstacle from her diplomatic path, and that the ad­
justment was both politically and territorially favourable.
In Admiralty circles, quite a different interpretation be­
came current. Navy Secretary Tirpitz, the main exponent of 
this line, thought that Germany had received an echec from 
England and Prance, which must be countered by a stiffening 
©f the military posture if Germany wished to remain a "great 
p o w e r . T h e  current anti-British sentiments of press and 
public opinion seemed very convenient for this purpose.
"If it turns out that we have received a diplomatic setback," 
wrote Tirpitz to his immediate subordinate, "there will be
a violent public indignation. The chances of a Novelle will
2thereby be increased."
It was an easy matter for the Admiral to convince William
^Tirpitz, Aufbau, pp. 199ff*
pIbid., p. 200, In this case, the term Novelle refers 
to an amendment of or supplement to the existing navy law, 
a law which governed the rate of shipbuilding of and finan­
cial allotments to the German navy.
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II, in whom the Morocco crisis had awakened resentment against
Prance and England, The Emperor thought it a pity not to
make use of the existing feeling in Germany to secure a
naval increase from the Reichstag; at other times, that body
could he so inconveniently parsimonious. On August 27, the
Emperor began to prepare the ground by hinting in a banquet
3address that he favoured an expansion of the German fleet.
The press immediately took up this statement; throughout 
Germany it was taken as an indication that a Novelle was 
necessary. He told the Chancellor that the important con­
siderations were the atmosphere of disillusionment in Germany 
and the German loss of prestige abroad, both brought about 
by the unfortunate course of the Moroccan affair. Only a 
fleet increase could remedy the situation. Tirpitz outlined 
a plan an increase in the present naval construction 
plans of six capital ships over a period of six years. In 
addition, there were to be increases in various other naval 
armaments, of a nature designed to enhance the fighting
4efficiency of the navy. Since the Admiral justified the 
increase with an interpretation of the Moroccan crisis direct-
^D. G. P.. XXXI, #11307. Editors’ footnote, pp. 3-5.
^Tirpitz, Aufbau, pp. 208ff. During the ilnglo-German 
controntation triggered by the Morocco crisis, a practice 
concentration of the British Navy had prompted German counter­
movements, during which the Admirals had discovered serious 
manpower and supply deficiencies. These were to be remedied 
by the Novelle. Walther Hubatsch, Die Aera Tirpitz, (Goettingen, 
1955) p. 90.
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ly opposed to Bethmann’s, the latter could not have been very 
favourably impressed. He made no immediate reply, but on 
receipt of a memorandum from the Admiral on August 30, he 
consulted the Foreign Office on the question, whereupon he 
made objections on two groundsî that such a Novelle would 
increase the danger of war with Great Britain, and that the 
existing tax structure could not support the additional 
financial burden. He and Tirpitz agreed to wait until the 
conclusion of the Pranco-German Morocco talks.^
On September 26, on the occasion of his annual report 
to the Emperor, Tirpitz again presented his views of the 
diplomatic situation and of the German navy’s role in world 
politics. The significance of the report is that Tirpitz 
advocated a new strategy of naval construction. Previously, 
he had defended the ’’risk” concept, which called for a German 
navy of such strength that, if the British navy engaged it in 
all-out battle, Great Britain’s great-power status relative 
to other naval powers would be endangered. Now he desired a 
fleet which would have at least a ’’defensive chance” of 
victory against the British fleet. Such a strategy required 
a three-to-two ratio in the capital ships of the two navies. 
He saw two alternatives for the achievement of this ratio;
Tirpitz, Aufbau. p. 209. Tirpitz here used the in­
cident to develop the impression of Bethmann’s weakness and 
indecision by picturing him as grasping with evident relief 
for this temporary respite.
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a mutual construction limitation to conform to the formula, 
or an independent German program to close the gap regardless 
of Great Britain's plans. Tirpitz claimed to prefer the 
first alternative, hut his language betrays that he did not 
consider it to be the likely one. Both alternatives would 
permit the passage of the Novelle which he contemplated. At 
any rate, Germany could publicly offer the two-to-three 
ratio to Great Britain, thereby placing the "onus of re­
jection" on that nation,^
The Admiral's plan evidently made a most favourable 
impression on William II, who immediately wrote the Chancellor 
in support of the idea. At this time, he still admitted 
the gravity of Bethmann's objections and promised to keep 
them in mind. Four days later, he sent the Chancellor another 
letter on the same subject, but this time he adopted the 
Tirpitz plan as his own personal solution, and relegated 
the Admiral to the role of an enthusiastic supporter of the
7Imperial idea. Since Bethmann knew who had originated the 
idea, he must have realized that William II's adoption of it 
as his own was the strongest form of support for a Novelle.
On November 11, the Emperor directed him to discuss the plan 
with Tirpitz, who, he claimed, had already been "acquainted
Glbid,, pp, 215-15. 
?Ibid,, pp. 217-18.
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with its outlines.”®
The discussion took place as directed on November 16.^ 
According to Tirpitz, the Chancellor agreed to accept a 
formal proposal of the expansion plan which should be in­
corporated into the 1912 navy estimates. The compilation 
of these estimates was to be retarded long enough to permit 
this inclusion. But Bethmann made it clear that his agree­
ment to accept the proposal did not indicate personal ap­
proval of the plan; on the contrary, he reserved the right 
to withhold his support from it in the Reichstag debates. 
Tirpitz interpreted this to mean that Bethmann might resign 
rather than support this aspect of the Emperor’s policy, if 
the Emperor pressed him on the issue. This interpretation 
was substantially correct. Fleet expansion so obviously 
contradicted the Chancellor’s goals in foreign policy that 
he could not support it under any circumstances. Meanwhile, 
he contemplated no resignation, but vigorous political 
resistance.
The internal struggle which resulted from Bethmann*s 
decision was another contest between the civilian and the 
military interpretations of Anglo-German relations. Part 
of the reason for the bitterness of the struggle was the 
fact that each side had its own representatives in ïhgland.
®D. G. P., XXXI, #11319, pp. 28-9. 
^Tirpitz, Aufbau, pp. 257-8.
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Almost every report from Ambassador Mettemich stressed the 
danger to ikiglo-Genaan relations of a Novelle such as was 
then contemplated. In fact, Mettemich felt obliged to 
repeat this warning so often that it caused him some em­
barrassment, Bethmann and Kiderlen fully accepted his in­
terpretation, The Chancellor had by no means given up his 
plan to bring about a rannrochement between the two countries, 
but, as he explained to Mettemich on November 22, the 
Emperor was so strongly determined on a Novelle that he
might even accept a change in Chancellors to secure its 
10passage. He saw only one way to avoid the naval expansion 
and the consequent deterioration of Anglo-German relations:
The government can withstand the pressure for pre­
sentation of a supplementary navy law, and likely for 
an army increase, only if Ihgland decides to work for 
a positive understanding with us, and proves this 
decision with actions.,.,I can convince His Majesty of 
the inopportunity of the Novelle only if the English 
government actually negotiates with us on the subject 
of a political understanding. Otherwise, His Majesty, 
as well as our public, will see in England's friendly 
assurances only an attempt to lull us to sleep for the 
moment, and thus to prevent our fleet increases,
Mettemich thought he could discern a change in the 
British attitude towards Germany following the Morocco 
crisis. The nearness of war and the disclosure of Great 
Britain's commitments to France had convinced many people 
that Anglo-German relations must be improved. In particular.
lOp, G, P . , X X n ,  #11321. pp, 31-3.
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there was an outcry against the policies of Sir Edward Grey. 
Mettemich told his Chancellor that opportunities for nego­
tiations seemed excellent, but that any naval expansion at 
the present time would certainly wreck these opportunities.
The Naval Attache, Captain Wilhelm Widenmann, made a 
very similar estimate of the English mood. He also recog­
nized a reaction against the diplomacy of Sir Edward Grey 
and a desire to avoid further crises which could lead to a 
European war. Yet he interpreted this mood in a peculiarly 
military manner; it meant to him only that the German fleet 
expansion could proceed at this time without fear of British 
countermeasures. The same atmosphere which suggested to 
the diplomats the possibility of and need for negotiations, 
meant to the military an opportunity to increase armaments.
Bethmann used Mettemich's reports to develop his case;
11Tirpitz used those of Widenmann. It was a question of 
which interpretation would gain favour with William. II.
The Emperor's choice was unambiguous, as the following 
example shows: in a despatch to Bethmannn prompted by a
particularly disagreeable Attache report, Mettemich count-
11The naval Attaché could not be directly controlled 
by the civilian government. He made his reports not to 
the Ambassador, but to the Secretary of the Navy, who also 
issued his instructions. He had almost the position of an 
ambassador for the naval expansion party. Jaeckh, 
Kiderlen-Waechter, II, pp. 85-6.
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ered Widenmann's position on every p o i n t . T o  the Attache’s 
conclusion that the fleet should he expanded now to exclude 
the possibility of a *• Copenhagen” in the future, he opposed 
his own conclusion that the Novelle was a step towards war. 
The Emperor decorated the Ambassador's report with twenty- 
nine sarcastic comments. "Twaddle and nonsense," he wrote,
"I agree entirely with the Attaché." Widenmann*s report 
he labelled; "outstanding,"^^
The conviction that the Novelle would seriously impair 
Anglo-German relations led Bethmann to use every available 
political pressure to prevent, delay or reduce the contem­
plated expansion in order to gain time to initiate another 
series of talks with Great Britain. Once the talks were in 
progress, he thought, the chance of their success would 
give him a lever of influence with the Emperor. He suggest­
ed to the army chiefs that an expansion of the army's 
capacity was far more necessary than a new navy law,^^
The army chiefs took the hint and put forward proposals of 
their own, which they based on the argument that the army, 
being more directly responsible for the safety of the
12p. G. P., x m ,  #11314, 11316, pp. 15-7, 18-20,and marginal notations.
I^Gaptain Widenmann was aware of his Emperor's feelings 
and used his position of favour to intrigue against Metter- 
nich, even to the point of accusing him of being amenable to 
influences from the British Admiralty. Tirpitz, Aufbau, p. 250,
14ibid.;.p. 266.
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15Fatherland, had prior claim to expansion. Bethmann asked
the Prussian War Minister, Josias von Heeringen, to defend
this position vigorously in connection with the Novelle.
On November 18, the Imperial Treasury Secretary Adolf
Wermuth, a close collaborator of the Chancellor, rebelled
against the planned double load on finances. Admiral
Tirpitz was probably correct in the assumption that Bethmann
17himself instigated the revolt. Ten days later, Wermuth
sent Tirpitz a long memorandum explaining that the present
tax structure could not support the load of both army and
navy i n c r e a s e s . the same day Bethmann informed the
Admiral that the Novelle could not be included in the 1912
Navy estimates as previously planned, but must stand alone,
since it was now not only a question of naval increase, but
of a general increase in armaments. Furthermore, a debate
on the measures in the upper house must await the Bmperor's
19decision on the question of new taxes.
15̂Friedrich Haselmayr, Diplomatische Geschichte des 
Zweiten Reichs von 1871 bis 1918% (Muen'chen, 1963) VI, 
i, p. 150.
1 AGraf Westarp, Konservative Politik im letzten Jahrzehnt 
des Kaiserreiohes. (Eerlin, 1935) I, p. &24.
1?Tirpitz, Aufbau, pp. 227, 258-59» 278-79. It later became evident that the reason was spurious, that here was 
sufficient surplus on hand to finance the Novelle without 
more taxes.
IGp. G. P., XXXI, #11324. pp. 35-43.
^^Haselmayr, Geschichte, VI, i, p. 150. Tirpitz, Aufbau. 
p. 261.
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Under this onslaught, Tirpitz remained intransigent 
until Wermuth tendered his resignation. In view of the 
impending Reichstag elections, this could have had serious 
consequences for the government’s working arrangement in that 
assembly. Tirpitz had no choice but to compromise; he 
consented to a reduction in the Novelle from six to three 
capital ships in the same time period. On January 25, the 
Emperor approved the reduced Novelle. As a further concession 
to Bethmann’s ’’conspirators,” the throne speech in the new 
Reichstag on February 7 made only general references to a 
fleet increase, without giving any details.
This was a political triumph for Bethmann, but at the 
same time it illustrated his lack of willpower in opposition 
to the Navy Secretary and the Emperor. He had managed to 
cut the Novelle’s shipbuilding program in half, and he had 
at least kept open the possibility of a further reduction.
But even this reduced Novelle was, in his personal judgment, 
a mistake. He did not resign because he feared that he 
would be succeeded by an open supporter of naval expansion, 
perhaps even by Tirpitz. Thus, he began the compromise 
practice of reluctantly carrying out a policy which he per­
sonally thought wrong. Similarly, he agreed to include the 
announcement of navy increases in the throne speech on the 
very eve of lord Haldane’s visit to Berlin, though he must 
have realized what effect that would have on his freedom of
84.
20negotiation.
While the Haldane mission originated directly from an 
intercession by private persons, it was made possible by an 
officially cultivated climate of reconciliation which became 
effective in the autumn of 1911. On the German side, Bethmann 
and Mettemich worked for a resumption of mglo-German nego­
tiations, whereby they hoped to prevent a sharpening of the 
naval rivalry. The Chancellor thought the situation ripe
for a general understanding, and directed his Ambassador to
21explore the possibilities in that direction. Mettemich
demurred; he explained that only a colonial settlement
seemed possible at the moment, and an attempt to gain a
general understanding would only make the British government
suspicious. Though he would carry out the instructions if
22Bethmann insisted, he felt obliged to point this out.
Bethmann had complete confidence in the Ambassador (a con­
fidence which his Emperor certainly did not share^^), and 
he permitted him to approach Sir Edward Grey in the manner 
he thought best. The resulting interview revealed no
^Ogee the interpretation of Heinrich Friedjung, Das 
Zeitalter des Imperialismus. (Berlin, 1922) III, pp.9Sff.
G. P., x m ,  #11341, pp. 78-80.
Ibid., x m ,  #11342, pp. 81-82.
^^See for example his marginal notation. Ibid.,
#11344, p. 86.
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startling change of attitude on Grey’s part, but Mettemich 
thought him well-disposed to a reopening of negotiations, 
Mettemich*s temporary substitute, Richard von Kuehlmann, 
came to the same conclusion, and reported it to Bethmann on 
January 8.^4 Thus, it seems likely that the Chancellor 
would eventually have initiated another series of mglo- 
German talks. In view of Mettemich’s scruples, these talks 
would have been on a very limited basis, and consequently 
would have had a fair chance of success.
The talks were actually resumed on the occasion of 
Lord Haldane's visit to Berlin, through the arrangement of 
two international businessmen. Sir Emest Cassel and Albert 
Ballin. The manner in which they went about their voluntary 
mediation led to misunderstanding from the start, for each 
government believed that the other had taken the first 
official step. Apparently Albert Ballin made the first move, 
asking Sir Emest Cassel to approach the First Lord of the 
Admiralty, Winston Churchill, with an offer to mediate be­
tween him and the German Emperor, and, if possible, to
25arrange for him to meet Tirpitz. Churchill, who thought 
the offer had emanated from the German Etaperor, declined to
24ibid., XXXI, #11345, pp. 87-92. This report irritated 
William II to such a degree that he drafted a note, in his 
own hand, to inform Kuehlmann of the wrongheadedness of his 
concepts of the British situation.
^^Ibid., XXI, #11347. Editors' footnote, pp. 97-98.
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visit Berlin, but declared himself in favour of negotiations.
Together with Lloyd George and Sir Edward Grey, he prepared
a memorandum in answer to the supposed German suggestion.
On January 29» Sir Ernest Cassel delivered the "answer" to
William II, in the presence of Ballin and Bethmann. In
Bathmann’s accurate summary, it proposed
...acceptance of English superiority at sea— no augmen? 
tation of the German naval programme— a reduction as 
far as possible of this programme— and, on the part of 
England, no impediment to our colonial expansion—  
discussion and promotion of our colonial ambitions—  
proposals for mutual declarations that the two powers 
would not take part ^  agressive plans and combinations 
against one another.^'
The memorandum contained nothing which had not been 
the subject of discussion before, but the Emperor received 
it with an enthusiasm and a sense of triumph which is 
difficult to explain. He interpreted the contents as "a 
formal neutrality proposal for the event of German involve­
ment in war, dependent on certain cutbacks in the area of
28naval construction." Such an interpretation was possible 
only from the viewpoint of the Widenmann-Tirpitz assumption 
that Great Britain found it nearly impossible to compete 
financially with Germany's naval construction, and desperate-
Bernhard Huldermann, Gilbert Ballin. (London, 1922) 
pp. 246ff. Grey, Twenty-Eive Years, I pp. 250ff.
Theobald von Bethmann Hollweg, Reflections on the 
World War. (London, 1919) pp. 48-9.
2®Wilhelm II, Leutscher Kaiser, Ereignisse und Gestalten 
aus den Jahren 1878-1918. (Leipzig, 1922) pp. 122ff. "
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ly nSeded a respite. In this light, the memorandum appeared 
simply as further proof of England's desperation; it is not 
surprising that William II thought he could exploit the 
British offer. Almost immediately he set down an answer 
in his own hand, accepting the British basis with the pro­
viso that the ITovelle, which was then in preparation, should
? Qremain intact. Bethmann thereupon gave a brief sketch of 
the Novelle to Oassel, who believed that the British govern­
ment would accept the German proviso.
Bethmann shared neither his Emperor’s enthusiasm nor 
his surprise at the contents of the British memorandum though 
he was probably surprised by the Emperor's reaction. Since 
he was also under the impression that the British government 
had taken the first step, he believed that the German proviso 
would be accepted. He was soon set straight by his ilmbassador, 
who saw no chance of a change of British policy in the direc­
tion outlined in the memorandum if Germany insisted on the 
30Novelle. The British answer gave convincing proof of this. 
While the spirit of the German reply was "cordially appre­
ciated" in England, the German naval programme caused great
^ihid., pp. 124ff. In his memoirs, he claimed that 
Bethmann, Cassel, and Ballin helped him to compose the answer, 
that he was only the recorder in a group of equals. Prom the 
contents, it seems to be mostly his own work.
5®Bethmann's original optimism, D. G. P., XXXI, #11348, 
pp. 99-100.
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31concem. The British government was prepared to negotiate
.if... German naval expenditure can be adapted by an alter­
ation of the tempo or otherwise so as to render any serious 
increase unnecessary to meet the German programme." On that 
assumption, Haldane, the War Minister, would come to Berlin 
for an unofficial exploration of the ground for negotiations.
Bethmann knew that William II was intransigent on jurt 
that point— that, in other words, there was no basis for the 
negotiations. Yet he replied on February 4 that Britain's
wishes in the area of naval construction could be accomodated
32in exchange for equivalent political guarantees. Ironical­
ly, William II annotated the German copy of this reply with 
guidelines which directly contradicted Bethmann's offer. He 
ordered negotiations "for the time being" on the basis of 
retention of the Hovelle. Later, under the Navy Secretary's
influence, the provisional decision for retention became 
33absolute. The same day, Bethmann wrote to Mettemich 
explaining the steps he had taken. He believed there was 
"not the slightest chance" that Sir Edward Grey could accept 
the German basis for the talks, though he hoped that a 
Liberal cabinet from which Grey was excluded might take up
110.
^Ifbid., XXXI, #11350. Editors' footnote, pp. 102-3. 
52lbid.. XXXI, #11351, pp. 103-4.
S^Ibid., XXXI, #11357, Editors' footnote, pp. 109-
89.
the o f f e r . G r e y ' s  exclusion seemed possible in view of 
recent severe criticism of his foreign policy. The ilm- 
bassador had to dispel this hope; Grey's departure, he 
said, could not be expected, for he had the solid support of
35Haldane, Prime Minister Herbert Henry Asquith, and Churchill. 
The German basis would, however, be accepted on the assump­
tion that Bethmann's answer implied a possible dropping of 
the Hovelle. Mettemich personally did not believe in this 
possibility, and called the situation a "vicious circle."
Of the British and German officials connected with this 
preliminary to the Haldane mission, only Mettemich and Beth­
mann were in a position to appreciate the colossal misunder­
standing, to note that the two parties were approaching the 
talks with contradictory purposes. Bethmann alone realized 
that the Emperor's whole conception of the affair was a 
dangerous delusion, yet he took no steps to set him straight. 
Clearly, he was directly responsible for initiating talks 
for which there was no common point of origin. A strange 
action for a moralist like Bethmanni His purpose becomes 
somewhat clearer from his attempt to keep possible sources 
of trouble uniformed until the government was committed. 
Tirpitz, for example, heard of the plans on February 5, the
34ibid., x m ,  #11353, pp. 105-6.
3^Ibid., XXXI, #11354, p. 107.
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day after Bethmann sent his accomodating a n s w e r , T h e  
Admiral was somewhat indignant, and considered this as a 
fait accompli designed to exclude his objections. "If I 
had been consulted," he told Bethmann, "I would never have 
approved of this unofficial procedure of initiating negotia­
tions through international businessmen." Tirpitz knew 
immediately that his Novelle was in danger, but the Chancellor 
assured him that it would be mentioned in the throne speech 
as planned. In the Admiral’s opinion, Bethmann was now 
unsure of himself, and began to doubt the wisdom of his 
action. "He realized that hesitation at this point might 
be dangerous."
Kiderlen played a very minor role in all phases of the
Haldane negotiations, and Haldane got the impression that
it was the Chancellor's intention to keep him out of the
37talks as much as possible. The reason for this is not 
clear; either Bethmann no longer trusted Kiderlen after 
his handling of the Morocco crisis, or he feared that the 
realistic Kiderlen would disapprove of the initiation of 
talks on a basis which offered little chance for settlement, 
but a great possibility of further misunderstanding and 
annoyance.
What did Bethmann hopeto gain from this deliberate
^^Tirpitz, Aufbau, pp. 280-83.
^^B. D. D., VI, #506, Haldane's dairy, pp. 676-85.
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gamble? Apparently he was conscious of his inability to 
force his decisions over the objections of the Emperor and 
the Navy Secretary. Yet he was unwilling to resign in pro­
test, so he decided to place both Tirpitz and William II 
before a fait accompli. If Haldane seemed inclined to 
discuss a far-reaching political agreement, Bethmann could 
use this fact to pry naval concessions from William II.
In his Reflections, he indicated that he simply did not 
accept the latter's decision to maintain the Novelle, but 
continued to work for its reduction.But to achieve this, 
he had to bring Haldane to Berlin, even if this could only 
be done by a misrepresentation of the Emperor's directives,
A man of bolder nature, in Bethmann's position, would no 
doubt have handed in his resignation. The Chancellor took 
no such demonstrative action, but he still resisted with 
great persistence and ingenuity this naval policy which he 
thought wrong. What was fatal to his undertaking was the 
fact that he did not negotiate alone, but in conjunction 
with the Emperor and the Navy Secretary. Under those cir­
cumstances, it was impossible to hide the lack of unity in 
the German government.
The Chancellor believed that there was a middle ground 
on which Great Britain and Germany could settle their differ­
ences with approximately equal concessions. In his earlier
Bethmann Hollweg, Reflections. I, p. 54.
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efforts, he had sought that middle ground in a formula of 
this sort* Germany concedes a certain reduction in her 
planned naval construction, in return for which Great Britain 
promises neutrality if Germany becomes involved in a war on 
the Continent; this provision to be reciprocal and not to 
take effect in the event of aggression by the parties to the 
agreement. In the past, the policies of both governments 
had prevented a meeting on this ground. German authorities 
clung to their right to naval expansion; the British scur­
ried for cover whenever the Entente seemed in danger, and 
Prance and Russia saw to it that this was often the case.
In the talks with Haldane, Bethmann was even more 
restricted than he had hitherto been. Willaim II desired 
to retain the Hove lie and to gain a definite neutrality
39agreement for Germany, but he mentioned no concessions.
On Haldane’s part, there was a similarly restricting in­
struction. The British Cabinet directed him to negotiate 
only on the basis of absolute loyalty to the Entente.
This meant that he could give assurances of friendliness, 
and he could offer various parcels of colonial real estate.
If a war actually broke out in spite of Britain's peaceful 
intentions, of which she was willing to give assurances, 
then Great Britain would be on Prance's side, regardless
^^Tirpitz, Aufbau. pp. 238-40. D. G. P.. XXXI, #11351, 
pp. 103-4. Williain II 's annotations.
^^Richard Burton Haldane, Before the War. (London, 1920)
p. 108.
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who was the aggressor. The fact that Bethmann and Haldane 
found it possible to agree on a political formula must be 
attributed to their fervent desire for success, which 
prompted them to exceed their instructions.
They met immediately on Haldane's arrival in Berlin, 
on February 8. Both negotiators confined themselves in this 
initial meeting to general explorations.^^ Haldane spent 
some time convincing Bethmann that Great Britain had no 
secret agreements with France and Russia. The Chancellor 
assured his guest that Germany did not intend to "fall 
upon France" as soon as Great Britain's neutrality was assur­
ed. When he went on to propose a neutrality agreement, 
Haldane illustrated the interpretational difficulties of 
this, suggesting instead a mutual undertaking in which the 
parties should assure each other that they had no aggressive 
intentions. Bethmann was not impressed, but he promised to 
consider the matter. On his part, he dutifully defended 
the German intention to form a third active squadron, and 
he thought he had convinced Haldane of this necessity.
That was not the main point of contention, said Haldane. 
Great Britain's alarm stemmed not from the third squadron 
proposal, but from the increase in Dreadnought construction
B. D. P ., VI, #506, pp. 676-85. Haldane's Diary. 
Bethmann Hollweg, Reflections. I, pp. 49-53. Viscount 
Haldane, Before the War, pp. 57-9.
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which would accompany its formation. On the colonial question, 
there was more agreement; Haldane outlined areas Great Britain 
might consider suitable for German expansion. In exchange, 
Bethmann assured him of German concessions regarding the 
Bagdhad Railway. The negotiators gained the most favourable 
impressions of each other; Haldane was convinced that Beth­
mann would do his best to overcome difficulties in other 
departments of the German government.
In his first talk with the Chancellor, Haldane adhered 
scrupulously to the limitations placed on him by the ex­
ploratory nature of his mission. Next day, his conversations 
with Tirpitz and William II departed markedly from this 
pattern, although Haldane stated at the outset that he was 
not an official negotiator.The Emperor began by explain­
ing that the present format of his Novelle was much reduced 
from its original form, that this in itself was a concession. 
But Haldane insisted that even this "reduced” tempo repre­
sented an increase in construction of capital ships, which 
could not be combined with a political understanding. There­
upon, William II and Tirpitz offered a postponement in the 
construction of Novelle ships from 1912-14-16 to 1913-16-19, 
which Haldane considered an improvement; in the Emperor's 
opinion, he had declared himself satisfied. Finally, they
42B. B. D., VI, #506, p. 679. Tirpitz, Aufbau, pp. 286-9.
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decided to go ahead with the political agreement alone; 
upon publication of such an agreement the Emperor could 
announce the modified naval construction arrangement.
The Navy Secretary and the Emperor made no allowance
for the limited authorization of their guest and opened
certain lines of discussion which had no place in a prelim"_
nary exploration. Bethmann had specifically warned Tirpitz
not to propose his two-to-three ratio, but the Admiral saw
fit to propose just that, though Haldane quickly disposed of
it.^^ Near the end of the discussion, William II gave
Haldane a detailed copy of the planned Novelle, evidently
in the hope that the latter would quickly glance at the
document and give it his blessing. Haldane, however, simply
put it in his pocket, explaining that technical navy matters
would be checked by the Admiralty.William II immediately
informed the Chancellor of his '*success," and this report
indicates the extent of his misinterpretation of Haldane's 
45role. He spoke of an "accepted" basis and of confidently 
expected actions of the British government: for him,
Haldane had become an official negotiator for the British 
cabinet. He thought the matter was practically settled.
45Tirpitz, Aufbau, p. 293. D. G. P.. XXXI, #11357, 
pp. 109-10. Editors' footnote.
G. P.. XXXI. #11380. vv. 145-48. B. D. D., VI, 
#506, p:' 6B0.
45p. G. P.. XXXI, #11359, pp. 112-14.
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Bethmann and Haldane could not regard William II’s
ham-handed interference as a success, Haldane confessed
to Sir Edward Goschen that he was appalled; toward the end
of the talk, he had tried to put on a cheerful face because
he hoped to accomplish more with the Chancellor; this,
Tirpitz and the Emperor had taken for an expression of
satisfaction with the results obtained.When he met the
Chancellor next day, Haldane found him also in a disturbed 
47mood. The Chancellor sought to impress on Haldane once 
more that a complete British rejection of the Novelle would 
end the negotiations. He certainly did not regard the 
Emperor's proposals as "accepted,"
The next day, however, Bethmann's pessimism disappeared 
entirely, for, contrary to expectations, he and Haldane
48worked out a mutually satisfactory political understanding.
In its final form, the understanding retained the British 
offer of assurances against unprovoked attack and aggressive 
design. To this it added a neutrality agreement in the event 
of a war in which the contracting party was not an aggressor, 
a clause which Bethmann particularly d e s i r e d . W h e n
4&B. D. P., VI, #504, pp. 674-75.
47lbid., VI, #506, p. 681,
G, P,, XXXI, #11362. PT). 117-20, B. D. D., VI,
#506, p, 681,
^^Bethmann's original version, Haldane's changes and tb< 
final version, see D, G, P., XXXI, #11362, pp, 117-20.
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Haldane sought to bring up the question of the Hovello, 
Bethmann avoided the issue on the grounds that it was a 
technical question which he was not competent to discuss.
He hinted, however, that a strong political agreement would 
give him leverage to reduce the construction programme. The 
document ended with a statement of each country's concessions 
and desires on the colonial and Bagdhad Railway questions.
This last meeting convinced the Chancellor that the
preliminary talks would lead to successful negotiations.
Thus, when Mettemich reported on February 12 that a complete
surrender of the Novelle might become necessary, he replied,
50rather indignantly, that he could not agree at all. He 
explained his standpoint as follows:
Haldane has admitted here the necessity of a fleet 
Novelle. He realized that, without a third active 
squadron, we have no fleet at all for two or three 
months every year...Haldane therefore directed his 
requests not to the complete deletion of the Novelle, 
but to the question of increased Dreadnought construc­
tion. The deletion of the Dreadnoughts is at present 
the only question which is under consideration. Whether 
or not we can go that far, I cannot say at present.
Should England desire this, the chances of our acceptance 
will depend on the scope of the political agreement.
The Chancellor's position on the Novelle becomes clear: 
he intended to remove the Dreadnoughts, if possible, and to 
pass it through the Reichstag simply as a measure designed 
to increase the efficiency of the existing forces; the fact
50p. G. P.. XXXI, #11367, pp. 122-23. Mettemich's. 
report as annotated by Bethmann. #11368, pp. 123-24. 
Bethmann's reply to Mettemich's report.
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that these would now he organized in three instead of two 
active squadrons did not cause him concern; he expected no 
British objections so long as the construction of capital 
ships was not effected. But he knew that Tirpitz and his 
followers would put up a stiff .resistance to any such at­
tempt to render the ITovelle harmless. In the interval be­
tween Haldane’s departure and the communication of the 
British reaction, Bethmann made two preliminary advances 
against the naval construction party. First, he sought 
to muzzle Widenmann, the troublesome Naval Attaché in 
London. On a recent occasion, the latter had spoken to a 
British Admiral about the desire of German ’’political 
circles” (Politik) to establish the two-to-three ratio 
in the navies of the two countries. Bethmann’s request to 
the Navy Secretary not to discuss such a plan had been 
ignored, but this was a different matter; an Attaché 
could simply be ordered to refrain from such discussion.
The Chancellor reported the incident to William II, and 
asked permission to reprimand Widenmann. After all.
Attachés could not be permitted to contradict the official 
position of the government.’ But the Emperor saw the situa­
tion in a diferent light* Widenmann’s conversation with 
the British Admiral was not official; they had merely dis­
cussed ’what was a common topic of conversation in naval 
circles." Furthermore, a naval officer could not be re-
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primanded by a mere civilian, but only by his ’’Highest 
Warlord,” and the "Warlord” did not see fit to reprimand 
him.̂  ̂
Shortly after this Imperial rebuff, the Chancellor 
evidently began to doubt the British acceptance of the 
political agreement, and decided he might after all need 
the concession of Novelle battleships as a lever with 
England. In preparation for that eventuality, he sent 
Kiderlen to the Admiralty to acquaint Tirpitz with this 
possibility. Tirpitz emphatically declined even to consid­
er the idea, and he informed the Emperor of Kiderlen's 
52proposal. This made it Kiderlen’s turn to be enlightened 
by the Imperial schoolmaster: since Haldane’s departure
nothing had come to his notice to warrant the conclusion 
that the capital ships of the Novelle needed to be sacri­
ficed to gain an agreement.55
I cannot understand how your Excellency can come 
to such a conclusion. Your Excellency must be in 
possession of new information, probably from a private
^^Tirpitz, Aufbau. pp. 295-94.
5^Ibid.. pp. 290-91.
55Kiderlen did not accept the reprimand without comment, 
but answered in an equally sarcastic letter (with ridiculous 
over-deference to His Imperial Majesty) explaining that he 
had merely tried to inform the Navy Secretary of the feel­
ings of the Foreign Affairs Department. This serves to 
illustrate the difference in personalities of Kiderlen and 
Bethmann. The latter quietly accepted the Imperial dis­
pleasure. Jaeckh, Kiderlen-Waechter, II, pp. 157-58.
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source. I venture to remind your Excellency that, on 
the specific request of the Chancellor, I have personal- 
ly taken a hand in the negotiations— apparently not 
without success— and I have the intention to continue 
to do so...I order, therefore, that any additional 
information in your possession be communicated to me 
at once.
The two incidents resulted only in an indication of 
the strength of Tirpitz*s influence on the Imperor, and 
the strength of their determination to realize the fleet 
increase.
Expectations of successful negotiations must have
been high in the governments of both countries following
Haldane’s return to England. Sir Edward Grey expressed his
personal satisfaction to Mettemich; this in itself may
not be very significant, but Prime Minister Asquith expressed
similar sentiments in the House of Commons, much to the
satisfaction of the members. In Germany, Bethmann made
54analogous announcements in the Reichstag. Such public 
announcements are not lightly made, and certainly not if 
it is expected that they will be contradicted by events.
Since the proposed political agreement could be evaluated 
at a glance, the British cabinet must at least have believed 
that further negotiations were possible on that basis.
54p. G. P.,XXXI. #11565, 11569 pp. 121, 124-28, and 
Editors' footnote. Haselmayer, Geschichte, VI, i, p. 172.
^^Sir Arthur Nicolson had immediately prepared a critique 
which proposed radical changes, but did not entirely reject 
the political agreement. Yet he was probably the most anti- 
German Foreign Office employee. B. E. P., VI, #507, p. 686.
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It is therefore likely that the crucial factor was the 
copy of the Novelle which the Emperor had so generously 
(and voluntarily) supplied. It required scrutiny, and the 
Admiralty’s objections were certainly not immediately 
available. That detailed study revealed increases in the 
size and fighting efficiency of the German navy in addition 
to the increase in the number of Dreadnoughts, and on 
that basis, the political agreement, in which Haldane had 
at any rate overstepped his bounds somewhat, seemed a totally 
one-sided concession on the part of Great Britain. The 
original optimism thus appeared unwarranted.
56The about-turn came ten days after the first reaction. 
Grey and Haldane told Mettemich that the German naval pro­
gramme called for a sizable expansion in personnel, which 
led them to believe that new units, in addition to the 
announced third squadron, would be formed in the near future. 
The construction of smaller vessels was to be similarly 
over-expanded. In consequence, Great Britain would be 
required to undertake large additional expenditures, and 
public opinion would under those circumstances refuse to 
permit far-reaching political agreements. Two days later, 
Mettemich received a memorandum setting down the Admiralty's 
calculation; on that occasion. Sir Edward Grey doubted if 
all the colonial territories Haldane had mentioned could
5Gp. G. P.. XXXE, #11570, pp. 128-50. B. D. P .. VI, 
#506, p. 679.
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be given in exchange for much smaller Bagdhad Railway con­
eycessions. Moreover, certain international legal complica­
tions had appeared. While these were not vital objections, 
the planned Novelle was an extremely serious one. If that 
main problem could be solved, the others would not present 
great difficulties. The two conversations amounted to a 
complete rejection of the tentative basis established by 
Haldane.
Bethmann was disappointed, but not surprised. After 
all, Mettemich had warned him of just such a possibility.
The Chancellor had at first rejected the wamin- , but 
later he sought to prepare the ground for further German 
concessions, so the possibility of a British rejection 
must have occured to him. The failure of this attempt to 
prepare for further German concession left him only one 
futile courses to stand firm for the time being on the 
Haldane basis. Accordingly, he prepared a memorandum which 
carefully illustrated the British abandonment of the original 
basis:
England drops part of her colonial offer, is complete­
ly silent on the question of the political agreement, 
criticises our increase of personnell and submarines 
despite our concessions in the rate of naval construc­
tion. We must see in this a complete disavowal of 
Haldane. We are nevertheless still ready for a politi­
cal agreement on the Haldane basis, and we will gladly
57p. G. P., XXXI, #11373, pp. 132-34. Anlage. B. P. P., 
71, #524, pp. 697-98.
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discuss English proposals in this a r e a . 58 
The Chancellor's conception of Haldane's role had 
never been unrealistic, and, as is evident from this state­
ment, the British disavowal of the exploratory talks did not 
in his opinion preclude further negotiations. Indeed, he
continued to agitate against the Novelle, though he official-
59ly supported its parliamentary passage. However, the 
Emperor's over-expectation now produced a violent over­
reaction. In fact, had not Bethmann and the Foreign Office 
put the damper on him, he would have plunged Europe into 
a crisis in order to appease his injured pride. Fortunate­
ly, his more questionable orders were simply not obeyed.
This is not to imply that he habitually ■ gave rein to his 
temper; on the contrary, he had been somewhat subdued 
since the Daily Telegraph incident of the Buelow days.
While his language still tended to be somewhat "picturesque" 
on occasion, his public statements and his actions were 
generally carefully considered. But this was a special 
case: he had personally taken a hand in diplomacy, and he
flattered himself that such Imperial intervention accomplished 
much more than similar action by ordinary m o r t a l s . I t  was
g. p.. XXXI, #11376, pp. 140-41.
^^Tirpitz, Aufbau, pp. 313-14.
^^Seo the dispatch to Kiderlen for his own estimate of 
the effectiveness of his intervention. Jaeckh, Kiderlen- 
Waechter, II, pp. 155-57.
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not Haldane’s disavowal or the change in the basis of nego­
tiations that mattered; he felt personally slighted.
As usual, he vented his initial fury against Metternich's 
report; "Haldane and I are totally disavowed," he noted 
in the margin.
This is an insolent intervention in the sovereignty 
of a great nation, and into the decisions of her high­
est War Lord. That is not negotation, but blackmail, 
and the delivery of sommations I I will not become in­
volved in anything of that sorti^^
He concluded his note with directions for Bethmann to proceed 
immediately with a detailed description of the Novelle in 
the Reichstag, so that it could be used to "soothe the 
worries and fears of the German people." Bethmann ignored 
this instruction. Next, William II directed Kiderlen to 
reprimand Ambassador Mettemich for accepting and forward­
ing such a document. Kiderlen also ignored this,^^
A greater shock awaited the Emperor: on March 4,
Mettemich reported a conversation with Haldane. The 
cabinet had decided that, depending on the size of the 
Novelle when actually passed, the Mediterranean fleet could 
be recalled to the North Sea to meet the increase of German
f:rz
naval power! Judging from the structure of his marginal
Glp. G. P., XXXI, #11374, pp. 135-36. Kaiser's marginal 
and summarizing notations.
G^ibid., XXXI, #11378, pp. 141-42.
G^Ibid., XXXI, #11380, pp. 145-48.
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comments, William II had difficulty containing himself.
Such a move would be regarded as casus belli, would be 
answered with the original version of the Novelle, and 
eventually with mobilization! He instructed Bethmann to 
send a telegram ordering the Ambassador to make representa­
tions to that effect in London. In addition, he repeated 
his order for the immediate publication of the Novelle.
If the Chancellor did not publish it immediately, he would 
have it published by army and navy authorities. "My patience 
and that of the German people is at an end," That evening, 
William II personally sent a telegram to Mettemich order­
ing him to make the representation he desired.
Such were the consequences of Bethmann's decision to 
remain in office despite his lack of sympathy for the 
Emperor's policy. As a result of the Chancellor's repeated 
circumventions of orders, the Emperor had finally taken 
things into his own hands. Bethmann now had no choice but 
to resign. The document justifying this step is of some 
importance, for it brings out his dedication to the cause 
of European peace and his sober insight into the German 
diplomatic situation.Bethmann gives the impression of
G4ibid., X m ,  #11385, 11386, p..155.
G^Ibid., XXXI, #11387, p. 156.
^^Johannes Hohlfeld, ed., Bokumente der Deutschen Politik 
und Geschichte von 1848 bis zur 6egenwart, (Berlin, 1951) il,' 
pp. 251-53.
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a man consciously working against fate; "Prom various 
directives given by Your Majesty the last few days, I 
have concluded that Your Majesty not only disapproves of 
my conduct of foreign policy, but also mistrusts my actions."
He explained that the constitutional position of the 
Chancellor did not permit the announcement of policy changes 
by ministry secretaries without his approval. But the 
main point concerned the negotiations with Great Britain.
At the moment, these negotiations have taken an un­
fortunate turn due to England's shifting of the basis 
of negotiations. Despite this, it is in my humble 
opinion our duty to carry on the negotiations if only 
to prevent a sudden, crass disclosure of their failure, 
or possibly to keep open the chances of renewed negotia­
tions if not now, at least at some time in the future. 
...If we do not do this, not only will our relations 
with England be aggravated in a dangerous fashion, but 
French chauvinism, which has already been rekindled, 
will be encouraged to the highest hopes. Prance will 
become so provocative that we will have to attack her.
In such a war. Prance will automatically have the 
assistance of Russia, and no doubt that of England as 
well, whereas for our allies, the casus foederis will 
not arise....I cannot be responsible for creating such 
a situation. If war is forced upon us, we will fight, 
and with God’s help, win. But to unleash such a war 
without our honour or vital interest being involved 
would be a crime against Germany’s destiny, even if we 
could look forward to complete victory. Even that is, 
at least on the sea, not to be expected.
He explained the instructions he had sent to Mettemich—  
to state in London that only the ship construction aspect of 
the Novelle was under consideration in the present negotia­
tions, but to emphasize German willingness to continue the 
talks on a political agreement. Into this situation,
William II had seen fit to interpose his own decision without
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Bethmann's consent. He had thereby removed control of foreign 
policy from him.
Your Majesty has evidently determined to conduct a 
policy for which, for reasons just stated, I cannot 
assume resposibility....On the strength of the office 
I hold from Your Majesty, I am responsible before God, 
country, history and my conscience, for the policy Your 
Majesty orders. Hot even Your Majesty can remove this 
responsibility from me.
For the events of the brief Oianoellor crisis, one must 
depend heavily on the account of Admiral T i r p i t z . The 
Emperor evidently collapsed under the pressure and conceded 
rather more than was necessary— namely to leave open all 
Novelle construction dates in order that these could be used 
in the negotiations. But now Tirpitz threatened to resign, 
and William II retracted the concession. The argument began 
anew, this time with the particpation of the Empress, who 
pleaded with the Chancellor to come to a decision (favourable, 
of course) and no longer to retreat befq^ English pressure, 
Bethmann could not have been unduly affected by the Lady’s 
distress, for he made only the minimal concession of dropping 
his categoric objection to the Novelle. Meanwhile, he would 
refrain from making announcements of its contents until all 
hope of a settlement with England had disappeared. He directs 
ed Metternich to approach Haldane with this information.^®
6?Tirpitz, Aufbau, pp. 318-20. 323-25.
G. P.. XXXE, #11394, pp. 166-67. Haselmayr inter­
prets this "mere postponement" as a victory for Tirpitz. 
Haselmayr, Geschichte, VI, Part I, pp. 176-77. On this day, 
the Emperor greeted Tirpitz with the words "we have won" so 
he evidently considered that Bethmann had retreated. Neither 
of these views seems justified.
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From the test of strength with Tirpitz, Bethmann emerged with
something close to a victory. His strength, the Emperor
admitted uneasily, lay in the great trust placed in him by
69foreign officials. Under these circumstances, a more 
aggressive nature, not satisfied with something only slight­
ly better than a stalemate, might possibly have carried a 
policy in complete opposition to the Grand Admiral. But 
Bethmann was not the man to seek total victories.
In consequence of his conviction that the Anglo-German 
talks must continue, Bethmann sent off another proposal for 
a political agreement, which he hoped might be favourably
considered in view of the postponement of the Hovelie publica- 
70tion. After a certain amount of pressure from Ambassador
Metternich, the British cabinet announced exactly what it
was willing to give in. the way of political guarantees in
71exchange for the complete scrapping of the Novelle. This 
formula, delivered on March 17, did indeed contain a clause 
which could be interpreted as a neutrality promise. In 
Metternich's opinion, the phrase "nor join in any unprovoked 
attack" implied a neutrality conditional upon Germany not 
being in any sense the aggressor. It was, of course, a very 
weak neutrality undertaking, certainly not much better than
^^Tirpitz, Aufbau, p, 324.
7^0, G. P.. XXXI, #11395, pp. 167-69,
^Ifbid,, XXXI, #11399, 11400, 11403, pp. 178, 181-3.
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the old British offer not to become party to anything which 
had an unprovoked attack as its object. It was still very 
far from the formula desired by Germany, which would guarantee 
British neutrality in case Germany became involved in a war 
on the continent against her own will.
Metternich further reported Grey stating that he con­
sidered Bethmann responsible for the present sensible German 
diplomacy and that, if he remained Chancellor, future Anglo- 
German friendship seemed likely. Metternich's wording of 
these alleged statements definitely implied a slight to the
Emperor, who fancied himself responsible for the continuity
72of Germany policies. He certainly interpreted the matter
as a slight. His outburst indicates that he may have found
Bethmann's famous integrity difficult to live with:
I have never before in my life heard of concluding 
an agreement with and on account of a particular states­
man. Prom the report, it is evident that Grey has no 
idea who rules here, and that I am responsible. He 
prescribes to me who shall be my minister if I wish to 
conclude an agreement with England.
This mood may explain why the now obvious collapse of the
73negotiations gave the Emperor a certain amount of pleasure.
72ibid., XXXI, #11403, p. 183. Emperor's marginal notation.
Grey's report of these conversations differs substantially 
in detail though not in spirit, from Metternich's report. Grey 
makes no mention of the various pro-Bethmann statements which 
Metternich attributes to him. He reports the Ambassador hintp 
ing at the far-reaching consequences of a "change of personnel" 
in Berlin. Possibly, Metternich deliberately sought to obtain 
pro-Bethmann statements in order to strengthen the Chancellor's 
hand. B. D. D., VI, #539, p. 715.
^^Tirpitz, Aufbau. pp. 328-30.
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William II, wrote Tirpitz, noted with relief that Bethmann 
had completely collapsed. He had advised him to change the 
basis of the negotiations completely, to make a public offer 
of a complete offensive-defensive alliance with the inclusion 
of Prance. If Britain rejected this, she would be exposed as 
the recalcitrant party, "The agreement talks on Haldane’s 
basis are dead."^^
The talks were indeed dead, although both parties went 
through the motions for a few more weeks. Bethmann chose to 
ignore the Bnperor’s suggested new basis, and to make one 
more try on the old b a s i s . But he displayed a great deal 
of impatience at the last British offer, which he merciless­
ly reduced to platitudes: "Sir Edward Grey wishes to assure
us that England will not, in the future, attack us without 
provocation; we must conclude that, in the past, we had to 
reckon with that possibility." In his memoirs, he remarked 
in this connection, "...it was characteristic of the English 
point of view as to peace and war that renunciation of un- 
provoded aggression should be considered an especial proof of 
friendship." All in all, his instruction to Mettemich on 
March 18 was a rather brusque demand for some action on 
England's part, and of course, this proved futile. On March 
22, Bethmann could no longer procrastinate: the publication
74ihid., p. 330. D. G. P.. XXXI, #11405, pp. 185-87. 
75p. G. p.. XXXI, #11406, pp. 188-89.
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of the Novelle removed the last basis for discussion.
It was characteristic of Bethmann that he did not blame 
Tirpitz and his followers for the breakdown of the talks; 
nor did he doubt the integrity of the British statesmen.
He made this summary of the reason for this failures
I...incline to- the vlaw that we had to do. with an 
honourable attempt to come to an understanding on the 
part of England. It failed because England was not 
Willing to follow out this understanding to its logical 
consequences. An understanding with us meant that 
France and Russia might lose the certainty that they 
could continue to count on the support of England in 
pursuing an anti-German policy. But that is just what 
England would not do and just what England could not do 
in view of its engagements.... That is the real reason 
why the attempt at an understanding was wrecked. The 
naval question was an important, but not a deciding 
factor.
In all fairness, something must be added to make the 
summary realistic. A British dismantling of the existing 
security system, (and this was at stake, despite all assurances 
to the contrary) which was necessary to achieve Bethmann’s 
plan, was unlikely and could not be expected so long as the 
British mistrust of Germany continued. The fleet increases 
served only to strengthen this mistrust. In this light, the 
Novelle appears as the crucial factor in the failure. Bethmann 
realized this, for he remained implacably opposed to it. In 
1919» he could not yet bring himself to admit this.
Events in Germany connected with the Haldane mission
^^Bethmann Hollweg, Reflections, I, p. 57^
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represented an open clash between the two competing policies
toward Great Britain; that of the Chancellor and that of
the Grand Admiral. Their exchanges of resignation salvos
left the issue in doubt; perhaps Bethmann even had the
better of it. There is no doubt, however, who had the final
victory. In May, 1913, the Admiral's arch-enemy, Ambassador
77Metternich, was recalled from his London post. Once again, 
Bethmann acquiesced in a decision he knew to be wrong.
G. P., XXXI, #11427, pp. 231-32.
CHAPTER IV 
THE BALKAN WARS AND ANGLO-GERMAN RELATIONS
In his memoirs. Sir Edward Grey traced a sequence from 
Austria's annexation of Bosnia to the Italian seizure of 
Tripoli and to the Balkan Wars, creating the impression that 
it was Austria's action which precipitated the real estate 
shift which almost wiped out European Turkey.^ It is at 
least equally valid to postulate France's Morocco entrench­
ment as the key to Italy's seizure of Tripoli and as the first 
event in the sequence. At any rate, shortly after the out­
break of war between Italy and Turkey, the Balkan states, 
under the leadership of Russia, took steps to realize their 
territorial ambitions at the expense of Turkey. Russia 
immediately revealed to her allies the contents of the 
supposedly secret agreement, and even the Triple Alliance
2soon had detailed information concerning this Balkan League.
It was evident that such an extension of Balkan Slav power, 
under the leadership of Russia, must soon come in conflict 
with Austria-Hungary, for this power with her numerous Slav 
minority groups was generally regarded as the next target for 
Balkan nationalism.
Diplomats both in England and Germany realized the
”*Grey, Twenty-Five Years, I, p. 260.
^D. G. P., XXXIII, #12058, pp. 23-26. Editors' footnote.
114.
danger of an Austro-Russian confrontation in the Balkans, 
and from this realization they derived similar conclusions. 
Such a situation eventually produced, unofficially, the 
kind of diplomatic accord which had been sought in vain 
through deliberate stimulation. For Bethmann's foreign 
policy, these wars and the diplomatic reverberations origin­
ating from them were of special importance; they eventually 
involved him in a choice between his diplomatic goal— friend­
ship with England— and the unquestioned basis of all German 
diplomacy— solidarity of the alliance with Austria. Ironical­
ly, Bethmann’s direct role in this development was compara­
tively small, for Kiderlen-Waechter took charge of Germany's 
foreign policy in the summer of 1912.
The stage was set for Anglo-German co-operation by the 
disillusionment of both powers with their alliance partners.
In the German government, the Austrian Foreign Minister 
Leopold Graf Berchtold had a poor reputation. It is difficult 
to avoid the conclusion that German officials did not really 
comprehend Austria's Balkan dilemma. When Berchtold pro­
posed collective Great-Power warnings in Constantinople and 
in Balkan capitals, Kiderlen characterized this merely as 
an attempt on Berchtold's part to confound domestic critics, 
who had often pointed out his lack of initiative. The 
Chancellor added that this was his impression as well.
^Ibid., XXXIII, #12087, pp. 49-51.
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When Berchtold eventually withdrew his proposal because of
negative reaction in Constantinople, Kiderlen informed
4Bethmann of this with gleeful sarcasm.
More serious, in Kiderlen's eyes, was the fact that 
Berchtold had neglected to consult with Germany prior to 
making his proposals. Since Chancellor Bethmann was to 
visit Berchtold in Buchlau on September 7 and 8, Kiderlen
5asked him to bring the matter to his host’s attention.
In view of the united stand of the Entente powers, Germany 
could not well follow a policy divergent from that of Austria, 
For this reason, it was particularly important that Austria 
consult Germany before taking action. "I would consider it 
useful," wrote Kiderlen, "if you Excellency could bring this 
standpoint out in a firm but friendly manner. We are not 
inclined to play the Austrian satellite in the Orient."
While German diplomats realized the importance of the Austrian 
alliance, this made them even more impatient with what they 
considered Austrian blunders. Berchtold fully reciprocated 
the distrust of his ally. At the Buchlau meeting, he was 
not impressed by the Chancellor's grasp of foreign policy
4lbid., m i l l ,  #12153, pp. 89-91.
5lbid., XXXIII, #12135, pp. 92-94. Ho doubt, the German Foreign Office was inclined to worry about Austria’s tendency 
to take precipitous action without consulting her ally ever 
since she had plunged into the annexation of Bosnia (1908) 
without giving adequate warning to Germany. (See B. G. P., 
XXVI)
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details; the latter seemed to agree with Berchtold's summary 
of Austrian policy mainly because he had neither the firm 
conviction nor the base of knowledge to disagree.^
Russian Foreign Minister Sergei 0. Sazonov's visit to 
Great Britain revealed a similar atmosphere of distrust be­
tween Great Britain and Russia. Sir Arthur Nicolson re­
ported great disappointment in Russia over Great Britain's
7apparent lack of sympathy for Russia's Balkan policy.
The Russian government's official communique produced negative 
press assessments of the value of the Entente for Russia.
The press felt that England's position as a major "Musselman" 
power prevented her from appreciating Russia's obligations 
as the major Slav power. Nicolson feared for the life of 
the Entente.
To the pressing Balkan problems, the British and German 
foreign offices offered similar solutions, a fact which did 
much to further diplomatic co-operation. Sir Edward Grey 
closed a dispatch to the British Ambassador in Austria with 
the following guidelines "We must do all we can to keep 
Austria and Russia co-operating together in Balkan affairs.
It is the only way to prevent them from falling out."® On
^6. U. A., VI, #3771, pp. 415-16.
?B. D. P., IX, #76364, 769-70, 808, 811, pp. 722-30. 
®Ibid., IX, #769, pp. 729-30.
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September 7, Kiderlen suggested to the French Ambassador
that Russia and Austria together should take the initiative
in Balkan matters. He undertook to use his influence in
Vienna to that end, on the assumption that France would act
9similarly in St. Petersburg.
This Anglo-German community of interest and the rapid
deterioration of the Balkan peace led Sir Edward Grey to
approach the German Changé d'Affaires, Richard von Kuehl-
mann, with an offer to keep the respective foreign offices
10in close touch during the crisis. Grey’s private secre­
tary, Sir William Tyrrel, continued the conversations, 
explaining that Grey was extremely tired of the long Anglo- 
German feud, and heartily desired to bring it to an end.
The present situation seemed an ideal opportunity to estab­
lish relations which might expand to all areas of conflict 
between the two nations. Kuehlmann, like Nicolson, saw in 
the Anglo-Russian disenchantment a possibility for the 
rupture of the Entente, and he promptly informed Bethmann 
of his discovery. His report was a very optimistic one.
Earlier in his Chancellorship, Bethmann might have 
greeted such a report with enthusiasm, for the breakup of
^D. G. P., XXXIII, #12189, pp. 139-40 and editors’ footnote.
"'^Balkan events October 14, peace between Turkey and 
Italy. October 17, Balkan wars break out. Grey's offer, 
Ibid., XXXIII, #12284, pp. 238-42.
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the Entente was the highest objective of his foreign policy. 
Now, he took scant notice. Kiderlen sent Kuehlmann a cautious­
ly positive reply, agreeing to the suggested co-operation,
but questioning the validity of Sir Edward Grey's "change 
11of heart." Why had he so carefully emphasized the personal 
and non-official nature of the conversations?
Please be sure to tell Sir Edward Grey that, though 
we are, as he can see, quite ready to go hand in hand 
with England, we must place two conditions on our accep­
tance. One, that the talks shall be absolutely secret, 
and in particular, shall not be given away by discreet 
hints....The other, that in case an agreement be achieved, 
it shall not be treated as a pudendum, but openly repre­
sented with the other powers....We are prepared to enter 
on this action only if we are certain that England will 
not merely use it to her own personal end and then sacri­
fice it to other relations.
Bethmann annotated this cynical document with one word:
"Agreed." Evidently, he shared fully his Foreign Secretary's
suspicions of British motives.
Before the opening of Balkan hostilities, the Great
Powers had unanimously and hypocritically decided that the
12territorial status quo must not be altered by the war.
The course of the war made short work of the resolution;
l^lbid., x m i l ,  #12287, pp. 233-37.
12 Since they were without exception aware of the exis­
tence and aims of the Balkan League and of Russia's leader­
ship thereof, they could not well have contemplated military 
action to prevent territorial aggrandisement of the Balkan 
powers at the expense of Turkey. Obviously, the declara­
tion was merely to prevent territorial expansion of Turkey, 
should she prove victorious.
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Turkish forces suffered severe defeats on all fronts and 
fell back almost to Constantinople. Negotiations of the 
powers therefore began on the basis of some territorial 
adjustment.
On October 28, Sir Edward Grey assured Kuehlmann that 
the Anglo-German co-operation, over which he expressed great 
pleasure, should continue through these dangerous develop­
ments. It would be particularly useful, he said, for the
13two countries to support joint Austro-Russian action,
Russia and France, on the other hand, came up with a pro­
posal on behalf of the Entente ; that the Great Powers
offer their mediation on the basis of their complete terri-
14torial disinterest. This represented a contradiction
of Grey’s desire to de-emphasize alliance groups, and he
15was understandably annoyed with his alliance partners. 
Germany and Austria saw the proposal as a trap for Austria, 
for that nation could not by any stretch of the imagination 
consider herself territorially disinterested.
Ear from expressing disinterest, Austria was firmly 
determined to prevent a Serbian extension to the Adriatic 
Sea. To this end, Austria advocated the creation of a new
T^ibid., XXXIII, #12305, pp. 259-60. 
14.
15!
I^ibid., XXXIII, #12307, pp. 261-70.
Ibid., XXXIII, #12346, pp. 300-1
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State, Albania, between Serbia and the Adriatic coast.
Though he encountered opposition from a vacillating Emperor,
Bethmann succeeded in placing German diplomacy firmly behind
this Austrian plan.^^ As usual, the Emperor issued frequent
and contradictory directives, which his diplomats did not
act on. Finally, he ordered a policy of firm support of
17Austria along the lines advocated by his Chancellor. This 
policy was then implemented.
In November, the question of a Serbian port put the 
German diplomats through a tight-rope act, the object of 
which was to continue co-operation with England, while at 
the same time firmly supporting Austria. Grey and Bethmann 
began by clarifying Austria's official position, which did 
not exclude fair Serbian territorial compensation elsewhere, 
but which precluded at the outset any possibility of a port. 
Russia, on the other hand, supported Serbia's claim to part 
of the Adriatic coast. The new German Ambassador in London, 
Prince Karl Max von Lichnowsky, adhered fully to his instruc­
tions and gave no hope that German influence could be used 
to bring about an Austrian retreat.^ At this point. Sir 
Edward Grey suggested a Great-Power mediation which would
l^lbid., XXXIII, #12346, pp, 300-1.
I^Ibid., XXXIII, #12349, 12405, pp. 302-4, 373-74.
I^ibid., XXXIII, #12399, pp. 363-64.
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treat the port question as part of the general settlement 
and would avoid an Austro-Russian confrontation on the 
issue. In this manner, both Austria and Russia managed 
an honourable disengagement.
When British and German diplomats realized how far 
co-operation between the two countries had gone, a curious 
reaction set in. They seemed to search for a new diplomatic 
balance, a new set of stable relationships. In the process, 
they delimited to each other exactly how far they would go 
in the de-emphasis of existing alliances. On November 25, 
Kiderlen released a press statement which so strongly em­
phasized the collective role of the European concert that 
it was interpreted as a check to A u s t r i a . T o  dispel 
the notion that Austria and Germany were in disagreement, 
Bethmann declared in the Reichstag:
Should there be— which we do not hope— insoluble 
differences, (when it comes to settling the affairs in 
the Near East) it will be a matter for those powers which 
are directly interested in that specific case to see that 
their interests are recognized. That holds also for our 
allies. If, however, in making good their interests they 
are unexpectedly attacked by a third party, and their 
existence is threatened, then we would, true to our al­
liance obligations, have to step resolutely to the side 
of our ally.
I^Helmreich is of the opinion that Bethmann intended 
the article to correct an erroneous impression given by the 
Emperor's exuberant statements to Francis Ferdinand on the 
occasion of the letter's visit to Germany. Ernst Christian 
Helmreich, The Diplomacy of the Balkan Wars 1912-15. (Cam­
bridge, Mass’.”,' T93ÔT p. 244.
20Ibid., p. 245.
122.
Clearly, Bethmann thought it inadvisable to leave any doubt
concerning the strength of the Dual Alliance, even at the
risk of endangering the promising Anglo-German co-operation.
He displayed here for the first time the fateful tendency
to over-compensate whenever the solidarity of the Dual
Alliance was questioned. A rapprochement with England was
no doubt still his goal, but he was not disposed to pursue
it in a crisis at the risk of jeopardizing long-standing
friendships. Sir Edward Grey was indeed somewhat taken
aback by the Chancellor's speech, but he also placed limits
21on the flexibility of his foreign policy. On two occasions 
he gave lichnowsky to understand that Germany could not count 
on British neutrality if a war developed (regardless, how) 
between Austria and Russia, and Germany joined her ally.
These mutual limitations seemed not to produce any resent­
ment, On the contrary, they provided added incentive for 
a peaceful solution to the real estate squabbles.
On December 4, an armistice ended Balkan hostilities; 
the former belligerents met in London to discuss peace terms. 
At the same time, the resident Ambassadors of the Great 
Powers met in conference to adjust the claims of their 
protégés without involving Europe in a war. The Triple 
Alliance entered the conference with demonstratively united
^^D. G. P., x m i l ,  #12447, 12481, pp. 417-20, 451-53,
125.
front, for on December 5, their alliance agreements had been 
renewed long ahead of schedule. In addition, Austria show­
ed her determination by the re-appointment of the aotiviët 
Chief of the General Staff, Count Franz Conrad von Hoetzen- 
dorf. Despite this stage setting of unity, Bethmann issued
instructions to avoid procedures which might emphasize the
22bi-polarity of the Powers, Proposals were not to be made 
on behalf of individual nations, lichnowsky was, however, 
to support generally the position of his allies, particular­
ly that of Austria. The German desire to avoid undue em- 
pyasis on alliances coincided completely with Sir Edward 
Grey's policy.
In the four days from December 17 to 21, the Conference
dealt effectively with the most dangerous question— the
23matter of a Serbian port. The solution was favourable 
to the Triple Alliance, particularly to Austria: Albania
was to extend from Montenegro to Greece along the Adriatic 
Sea, and Serbia was to be compensated with a railway outlet 
to a neutral Albanian port. The problem of the location of 
the fortress of Scutari, however, proved more difficult of 
solution. On Kiderlen's advice, the conference adopted a 
dilatory procedure to avoid a showdown before the Christmas
22lbid., XXXIV, #12540, pp. 44-6.
^^Ibid.. XXXIV, #12545, 12557, pp. 55-4, 65-4.
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recess.
Four days were sufficient to reveal the position of the 
new German Ambassador; despite his instructions, lichnowsky 
displayed great sympathy for the positions of Great Britain 
and Russia. He was particularly impressed by Grey's chair­
manship of the conference, which he described as flawlessly 
neutral. He claimed to detect a pronounced loosening of 
Entente bonds; Sir Edward Grey, who had to this point support­
ed the position of the Triple Alliance, now had every right 
to expect Germany to bring Austria around on the Scutari 
matter— to let this fortress go to Montenegro instead of to 
Albania as Austria desired.
Bethmann and the German diplomats were still on their 
guard; they shared neither Lichnowsky's enthusiasm for Grey 
nor his estimate of the Entente 's troubles. In their view, 
the quid pro quo suggested by Lichnowsky was not required. 
Russia had gained substantially through the great success of 
her Balkan allies, a success which would have been impossible 
without Austria’s great forbearance. The latter now had 
the right to safeguard her interests in view of the growth
of Slav power on her borders. Kiderlen feared that Lichnow-
25sky was "being taken" by Sir Edward Grey. He was probably
^^Ibid., XXXIV, #12557, 12558, 12561, 12562, pp. 65-74.
In his opinion that the Entente bonds were loosening, Lichnoy- 
sky was vigorously supported by the enthusiastic Kuehlmann.
^^Ibid., XXXIV, #12557, pp. 65-4. Kiderlen's annotations.
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right. Judging from the words of the Russian Ambassador 
Count Paul Benckendorff, Russia was quite satisfied with 
Sir Edward Grey's attitude: "England does not wish war,
therefore she works toward compromise, which will assure a 
Russian success, consequently a success of the Triple 
Entente.
To this point, Kiderlen, the acknowledged Balkan expert, 
had directed foreign policy almost singlehandedly; only 
occasional approvals from Bethmann are in evidence. Kider­
len's death on December 30 forced Bethmann to take once more 
an active part in the conduct of diplomacy. His first task 
was to issue instructions for the renewal of the Ambassadors' 
conference. He told lichnowsky specifically to co-operate 
with British diplomats in order to avert a renewal of hos­
tilities in the B a l k a n s . O n  January 4, 1913, Grey pro­
posed a Great-Power demarche in Constantinople, which Beth­
mann agreed to support. He refused support for a French 
proposal of an accompanying naval demonstration, partly
because he knew Sir Edward Grey to be in opposition to such 
28a step. While he was thus tenderly concerned with Anglo- 
German co-operation, he did not fail to support Austria;
ZGjbid., XXXIV, #12561, pp. 70-73. Stieve, Per Diplo- 
matische Schriftwechsel Iswolskys 1911-14. (Berlin, 1924) 
III, p. 58.
27p. G. P., XXXIV, #12592, pp. 102-3.
Z^ibid., XXXIV, #12616, pp. 129-31.
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when the Russian Ambassador in Berlin complained of Austrian
intransigence, he answered with a sharp refusal to put pres-
29sure on his ally. He advised Russia to approach Austria 
directly and to seek a solution by mutual compromise.
As the Conference took up the task of adjusting Albania’s 
borders, there was more difficulty with Lichnowsky, who 
persistently advocated German pressure to reduce Austria’s 
d e m a n d s . T h e  same request came from Grey through his 
Ambassador in Berlin, but Bethmann held fast to his deter­
mination not to pressure Austria. In answer to Grey, he 
suggested British pressure on Russia instead.Meanwhile, 
lichnowsky supported his Alliance partners only with ill- 
concealed reluctance. He reported Russian Ambassador Bencken­
dorff declaring that Russian could no longer yield in the 
matter of Albania. Lichnowsky was sure this was no bluff; 
he was thoroughly alarmed. "If we neglect to tell Austria 
that we do not desire war over Albania and Serbia, war will 
come." On receipt of this somewhat hysterical plea, Beth­
mann decided that it was time for a thorough reorientation 
of his Ambassador, but this proved to be a difficult process.
29lbid., XXXIV, #12635, p. 149.
3^Ibid., XXXIV, #12696, pp. 210-11.
51lbid., XXXIV, #12705, p. 223.
^^Ibid., XXXIV,##12708, 12748, 12763, pp. 227-28, 270, 
281-83, steps in this process of reorientation.
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On January 20, the Chancellor replied to Lichnowsky's warn­
ing that he might have reminded the Russian Ambassador of 
Austria’s vital interest in the shaping of Balkan affairs; 
Russia’s interest, on the other hand, was merely a sentimen­
tal one. Moreover, Austria had accepted Serbian occupation 
of the Sandjak of Novi Bazar, a very significant concession 
which Benckendorff had evidently forgotten. "Our policy,’’ 
he concluded,
...will support Austria's wishes insofar as necessary 
to maintain our ally’s Great-Power position. If it 
thereby comes in opposition to Russia, it is because 
Russian policy aims at a reduction of that Great-Power 
position. I beg your Excellency to keep these points 
in mind during the coming negotiations.
Such a lecture from Kiderlen would probably have terminated
the discussion. With Bethmann, Lichnowsky chose to make
the point again. He could not judge, he said, whether
Russia’s Balkan interests were indeed only sentimental;
nor could he ignore the fact that public opinion could be
as easily aroused by sentimental as by rational consideration—
vide the Hohenzollem candidature to the Spanish throne.
As for Austria, he feared that influential circles in Vienna
were resigned to the inevitability of a war to solve the
South Slav dilemma. They could only entertain such hopes
with full expectation of German support, Huch unconditional
support must therefore be denied them.
Once more the Chancellor rejected the viewpoint, this 
time with the patient irony of a kindly professor. He did
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not mind controversial viewpoints on foreign policy, par­
ticularly when expounded with lichnowsky's skillful histori­
cal and political excursions, but in the performance of his 
duties, the Ambassador must set aside his personal feelings 
in favour of energetic pursuit of the policy laid down by 
the Chancellor, l'or the present, "...our task is clear; 
Solution of the Scurari question through compromise and 
co-operation with Great Britain, but without undermining 
our relations with Austria." Like Lichnowsky, he desired 
closer co-operation with Great Britain, but
...our present co-operation with England, which cannot 
be nurtured too carefully, is not based on sentimental 
considerations, nor solely on mutual desire for peace.
The English are accustomed to sober calculations and 
noting the united action of the Triple Alliance, they 
endeavour to keep their existing connections intact.
We must do the same, or expose ourselves to the danger 
that an England whose ties to us are still rather weak 
will, under pressure from Russia and Prance, abandon us. 
That would have the most disastrous consequences.
There is further evidence of Bethmann’s continuing mis­
trust of Great Britain. Prom time to time, rumors arose that 
the Entente powers had an agreement on the diposition of 
territory in Asia Minor in expectation of a Turkish collapse, 
Germany had important interests in the area, and could not 
stand by idly in such an event. When questioned in the 
Reichstag, Bethmann gave reassuring answers, but privately 
he felt useasy over the matter. CM January 25, a renewal
55p. G. P.. XXXIV, #12710, pp. 229-30, and editors'footnote.
129.
of Balkan hostilities seemed imminent, and with this, the 
possibility of a Turkish collapse reappeared. The Chancellor 
indicated his doubts in a memorandum.Germany must not 
be faced with the fait accompli of an Entente agreement for 
spheres of interest which would in time turn into protector­
ates. He did not care to have a repetition of Morocco. 
Germany must indicate to Great Britain that a liquidation 
of Asia Minor could not take place without her full parti­
cipation; he instructed Lichnowsky to approach Sir Edward 
Grey with this information.
In London, the Ambassadors' conference began to seek a 
solution to the Serbo-Albanian border problem. Since Austria 
and Russia had adopted completely intransigent attitudes, 
the question could not safely be taken up in the Conference 
without preliminary work behind the scenes; otherwise, it 
might become a matter of national honour for each country. 
Consequently, Germany and Great Britain acted behind the 
scenes to arrange compromises in advance in every situation 
that threatened a showdown. When concessions were not
forthcoming, the two go-betweens procrastinated until some
55room for negotiation appeared. Meanwhile, Lichnowsky 
continued to complain bitterly. The Foreign Office, he
^^Ibid.. XXXIV, #12557, pp. 255-56.
55For a description of the modus operandi, see Grey, 
Twenty-Five Years, I, pp. 266-69.
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said, was asking him to be "more Austrian than the Austrian 
Ambassador," and to defend so-called Austrian "concessions" 
which were not concessions at all.^^
On February 12, Grey admitted privately to lichnowsky 
that Scutari was strategically an Albanian city. In the 
language of that complicated diplomacy, this meant that 
Russia would concede the same point in the Conference. This 
left practically only one town in dispute, a place of 6000 
inhabitants called Djak>va. In a perfect illustration of 
the possibilities of the "old diplomacy", the Great Powers 
of hurope were locked in a struggle over an obscure Balkan 
town of which the vast majority of Europeans had never heard. 
Grey and Lichnowsky confronted each other with the embarras­
singly small "concessions" they had to bargain with. The 
differences in question became smaller each time, but would 
not disappear. Religious and economic concessions were of­
fered, but the town itself remained the desired object of 
both parties.
At this point, Bethmann decided to apply some slight 
pressure to Austria. Russia, he said, found it extremely 
difficult to retreat gracefully in the face of Austrian
56%. G. P., XXXIV, #12794, 12817, 12826, pp. 320, 
345-46,"355-56.
57lbid., XXXIV, #12838, p. 366.
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38intransigence. The Chancellor touched the dangerous topic: 
British friendship, which Germany was not seeking only for 
a selfish purpose, should on no account be jeopardized by 
unreasonable resistance to compromise. It was only a gentle 
hint, but it represented a turning point in the Chancellor's 
attitude toward Austria.
Eventually, Russia and Austria prepared the way for a
solution by direct negotiations, as Germany and Great Britain
had often advised. As a result of Prince Hohenlohe's mission
to St. Petersburg, the two Balkan rivals affected an easing
of military tension by agreeing to a demobilization of border
30forces which had long remained on the alert.  ̂ In this more 
relaxed atmosphere, concessions came easier. On March 4,
Grey offered full Russian support for other Conference de­
cisions if Austria would concede Djakova to Serbia. The 
likelihood that force would be needed to evict the Montene­
grins from Albania's Scutari convinced Berchtold to accept 
this offer, but not before Bethmann applied one more touch 
of German pr essure.This represented virtually a solution 
of the Serbo-Albanian border issue. The London Conference 
of Ambassadors quickly produced an official decision, and
38lbid., ZXXIV, #12818, p. 346.
39lbid., AXnv, #12692, 12891, pp. 414-15. On the 
purpose and results of the Hohenlohe mission.
40lbid., XXXIV, #13002, pp. 538-39.
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on April 15, 1913, the Great Powers acquainted the Balkan 
states with the future Serbo-_*lbanian border.
There is an interesting sequel to the Scutari question, 
which again shows Great Britain and Germany in full diplo­
matic accord. King Nikita of Montenegro, unimpressed by the 
Great-Power decision, continued the siege of Scutari in con­
junction with Serbian detachments. The Great Powers decided 
to put pressure on Montenegro, but Russia proved unwilling to 
take action against a Slav p o w e r . 42 in consequence of this 
delay, Austria prepared to take independent action against 
Montenegro and Serbia.
To Russia's surprise. Great Britain decided to partici­
pate vigorously in proceedings to oust the Montenegrins, 
an action which was applauded in German diplomatic circles.
The Conference of Ambassadors, prompted by Grey and Lichnow­
sky, proposed a collective naval demonstration. It was a 
foregone conclusion that Russia would not actively partici­
pate, but when Prance also seemed to hesitate. Sir Edward 
Grey expressed the idea that Austria and Italy alone should 
be empowered to use force. Shortly thereafter, Prance an­
nounced her full participation, a development which in Germany
4^B. L. D ., IX, #47, p. 386.
G. P., XXXIV, #13029, 13035, pp. 564-65, 569. 
45lbid., XXXIV, #13038, pp. 571.
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was credited to Grey's influence.
King Nikita was not more impressed by the naval demon­
stration and by the demands of its British Admiral than he 
had been by the decision of the Great Powers. He charged 
the Powers with a breach of neutrality in his war with 
Turkey, and continued the siege. Emperor William II did 
not share his royal colleague's strong nerves and he began 
to doubt, after all this time, the feasibility of establish­
ing an independent illbania. It was all Bethmann could do 
to prevent him from collapsing under pressure from the King 
of M o n t e n e g r o T h e  arguments Bethmann used to convince 
William II show the former completely confident of continued 
co-operation with Great Britain. There was no cause for 
despair over the question of nlbania, he said. The key to 
the issue was England's attitude, and since that country 
strongly favoured the establishment of Albania, Germany 
could co-operate with her while at the same time safeguard­
ing the interests of her Austrian ally. For Austria, he 
continued, the matter was absolutely vitalî
The Albanian buffer state is the only positive result 
which the Danubien Monarchy can save out of the ship­
wreck of her Balkan aspirations. Should even this modest 
gain elude her at the last moment, her foreign policy 
would be faced with a bankruptcy which would endanger 
her international power status as well as her national
44lbid., XXXIV, #13081, p. 614.
45lbid., XXXIV, #13108, pp. 640-42.
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cohesion. To prevent such a development, which would 
be a loss not only for Austria but also for her allies, 
is the most important task of our diplomacy at the moment.
Bethmann's faith in Sir Edward Grey's fortitude was 
not misplaced. Though Montenegrin troops finally captured 
Scutari, they were not permitted to remain long in that city. 
Grey announced publicly that, failing a withdrawal of Mon­
tenegrin troops, "any interested power" could reasonably be 
expected to take independent a c t i o n . ( I n  this case, 
"interested power" meant "Austria".) Though this further 
aggravated the difference between Britain and Russia, it 
finally brought King Nikita to his senses. He preferred 
"voluntary" withdrawal to expulsion by the Austrian army.
On May 4, he surrendered Scutari to a landing party from 
the demonstrating naval vessels.
There is little doubt that Sir Edward Grey and Bethmann 
Hollweg were responsible for the preservation of peace in 
Europe. The former had prevented Russia from stiffening 
the resistance of Serbia and Montenegro in the face of 
justified Austrian demands. The latter had prevented pre­
mature Austrian action which would have forced Grey's hand.
In this manner, Bethmann preserved for Austria that minimum 
of victory which prevented her collapse in the Balkans.
With one or two exceptions, Bethmann was able to combine 
co-operation with England and scrupulous concern for the
4&B. D. P ., IX, #876, 886, 887, 892, 894, 899, pp. 404-428.
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welfare of Austria.
After the World War, Bethmann declared that the soli­
darity of the Dual Alliance had at all time been his pri­
mary c o n c e r n . T o  this point in the Balkan Wars, this is 
largely true, but during the course of the war between 
Bulgaria and her former allies, he seems to have departed 
significantly from this rule. In fact, Austro-German dif­
ferences developed with the first hint of war. Bate in 
June, Berchtold requested German diplomatic pressure on 
Rumania.^® That country's territorial demands on Bulgaria 
were, in his opinion, playing into Russia's hand, and he 
asked Germany to make this point in Bucharest. The German 
Foreign Office, however, declined on the grounds that the 
onus for conciliation was on Bulgaria, since Rumania's 
demands were quite justified. Hostilities between Serbia 
and Bulgaria began a few days later, and Rumania mobilized 
her forces on the Bulgarian frontier to add greater emphasis 
to her territorial demands. How Berchtold warned Germany 
that Austria did not intend to see Bulgaria decisively de­
feated by the Serbs and their allies, Serbia was the "Pied­
mont" of the Balkans, and any strengthening of Serbia was 
a mortal danger to the Dual Monarchy.
Bethmann Hollweg, Reflections, I, pp. 78-9. 
G. P.. %%XV, #13428, pp. 66-70. Anlage,
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This prompted Bethmann to intercede p e r s o n a l l y .^9 It 
was, in his opinion, definitely Bulgaria’s turn to show 
evidence of a conciliatory spirit. On no condition should 
Rumania be alienated from the Alliance by unfair pressure; 
she would be driven straight into Russia's arms. Moreover, 
a Serbo-Bulgarian conflict must be favourable to Austria, 
for regardless of the outcome, both nations would be weakened 
and dependent upon Austria's goodwill for many years. Even 
with a complete Serbian victory, "the fat will not be in 
the fire." On the other hand, he explained, an Austrian 
attempt to deprive Serbia of the fruits of victory would 
lead to a European war if attempted by force.
I can only hope, therefore, that Vienna will not 
be disquieted by the chimera of a Greater Serbia, but 
will await the decisions of the theater of war. I must 
advise strongly against any attempt to swallow Serbia, 
which could only weaken the Monarchy.
It was a noble attempt to keep Austria on a peaceful 
course, but an attempt based on faulty reasoning! The notion 
that the war would weaken Serbia and make her dependent on 
Austria's goodwill was soon refuted by events, Berchtold's 
"Piedmont" analogy proved to be tragically correct.
In contrast to Bethmann's troubles with Austria, his 
relations with Great Britain showed continued improvement.
Sir Edward Grey chose this moment to answer the Chancellor's
49Ibid.. XXXV, #13491, pp. 130-51.
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query concerning Asia Minor. German interests there would,
he assured him, receive full consideration in the event of
50a Turkish collapse. Grey also made it his business to
let the Chancellor know that he disapproved of Austria’s
51attitude in the present crises. A similar situation 
existed in the Ambassadors' Conference which, during the 
summer was discussing the Greek-Albanian border. Again,
Grey found occasion to complain about a lack of co-operation 
from Austria, and lichnowsky naturally forwarded these com­
plaints to Bethmann. One can imagine that he reported them 
with great personal satisfaction.
It was the Bucharest peace conference which revealed 
the seriousness of Austro-German differences. Here, the 
Emperor emerged once more as an important factor in the 
conduct of German diplomacy. The key question was the as­
signment of Zavala, a town which Austria claimed for Bul­
garia, whereas Germany, partly for dynastic reasons, favour-
52ed its assignment to Greece, For once, Germany found 
herself in agreement with France, a situation which brought 
applause from England. Equally unique was the fact that
^^Ibid., XXXV, #13436, pp. 75-77. Such a collapse was, 
however, no longer an immediate possibility,
^^Ibid., XXXV, #13481, p. 121.
52The Greek king, Constantine I was the German Emperor’s 
brother-in-law.
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Russia supported the Austrian p o s i t i o n . T h e  German Foreign
Office instructed its Ambassador in Austria to make the
German position more palatable to Austria by pointing out
the desirability of securing Greece as an adherent to the
Triple Alliance.
The argument failed to impress Berchtold. He made one
last attempt to convince his ally of the folly of support- 
55ing Greece, The key to all Balkan possibilities, he ex­
plained, was Serbia, Given Serbia’s undoubted and (in the 
foreseeable future) irreconcilable animosity, Bulgaria was 
the logical counter weight. A reconciliation between Bul­
garia and Rumania could be achieved with Germany's support; 
that was the most useful and the most practical Balkan 
alignment. Greek friendship, while in itself desirable, 
could not be depended on because of that country's involve­
ments with Serbia. Moreover, in the event of a war with 
Russia and her allies, Greece would be of little use to 
the Triple Alliance.
The lecture was to no avail. On August 7» the peace 
conference at Bucharest resolved the border question in
5^0f course, the important matter for each country 
was the future alignment of Greece or Bulgaria, the cross­
alliance support being only a by-product of the jockeying 
for new allies.
G. p., XXXV, #13724, p. 364. 
55lbid., XXXV, #13741, pp. 365-67
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favour of Greece. The German Foreign Office strongly advised
Austria not to exercise her right of revision with regard 
56to Kavala, Indeed, if Ambassador Heinrich von Tschirschky 
followed his instructions, Austrian diplomats must have 
known that they would, in such an event, stand completely 
alone.
/my chance of a misunderstanding disappeared with another 
ham-handed interference by the Emperor, On August 7, King 
Charles of Rumania wired William II, saying in part, "After 
important difficulties have been surmounted, the conclusion 
of peace is assured and, thanks to you, remains certain..,"57 
The Emperor expressed "great satisfaction," King Charles 
thanked him with "pride and genuine gratitude." When William 
II decided on immediate publication of the telegrams, Beth­
mann sought to dissuade him from this step; while he approved 
this direction in diplomacy, he had no desire to make public 
the Austro-German differences, or to give further offence 
to the Dual Monarchy. But the Emperor overrode his objec- 
tions.^ As Bethmann had anticipated, the Austrian press 
gave dramatic emphasis to the divergence. The Neue Freie
5^Ibid., XXXV, #13741, pp. 365-67.
57lbid., XXXV, #13741, pp. 365-67.
58ibid., XXXV, #13736, pp. 368-69.
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Presse of Vienna phrased it thus: "For the first time in
this long crisis, the German Empire is not on our side, and 
not in favour of our p o l i c y . "^9
Now, Bethmann found little solace in improved Anglo- 
German relations. For the first time in his career as 
Chancellor he had permitted the erosion of what was for him 
the one unquestionable commandment of German diplomacy: 
the solidarity of the Dual Alliance I What could be more 
natural than that he should attempt to repair this breach 
during the next Balkan crisis?
59lbid., X33V, #15749, p. 572. Editors' footnote.
"Heue Freie Presse," 11 August 1913.
CONCLUSION
It is a relatively simple matter to pinpoint crucial 
instances at which a different decision by Bethmann Hollweg 
might have reversed the drift toward catastrophe: had he
gone slower in his initial approach to England, had he not 
insisted on a formally-negotiated and duly signed reconcili­
ation, he might have established some sort of ^nglo-German 
bond. Such a bond might even have developed naturally had 
he refused permission for the dispatch of a gunboat to 
Agadir. In 1912, had he pressed for a complete victory 
over Tirpitz before withdrawing his resignation, he might 
have established the superiority of civilian policy over 
the alleged needs of the military. However, the task of a 
student b.f history is not to re-play the diplomatic game, 
but to understand the reasons for the decisions which were 
made.
In his attempt to alter Great Britain's position in 
the alliance structure, Bethmann operated within very narrow 
bounds. The chief motivation for his efforts was a feeling 
of insecurity derived from the knowledge that Germany's 
alliance was weakening, both strategically and structurally 
relative to that of her rivals. However, any re-alignment 
had to be achieved without a preliminary dissolution of 
existing bonds, for the alliances were important not only
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in the event of war, hut in everyday diplomatic relations. 
Thus, a weakening of one alliance would have an immediate 
and increasingly weakening effect on the world positions of 
countries within that alliance. This explains Bethmann's 
tedious insistence on official negotiations, on immediate 
tangible proof of friendship. Certainly, he could not risk 
alienating an alliance partner on the mere chance of secur­
ing a different alignment of powers.
Moreover, Bethmann directed only one of two German 
foreign policies, and was thus constrained to produce visible 
results to retain support for his policy. It is ironic that 
the other policy, directed by Navy Secretary Tirpitz, had the 
same goal of producing a change in Great Britain's status, 
though it used an approach completely in contradiction to 
that of the Chancellor. While Bethmann sought this objective 
by means of reconciliation and settlement of differences, 
Tirpitz used the pressure of armaments in an attempt to 
force a change of position of Great Britain, a procedure 
we know today as a "cold war." Both policies climaxed in 
the Haldane visit, and both failed, partly because they 
cancelled each other.
Following the Haldane mission, Germany really had no 
policy toward Great Britain, other than an implicit return 
to reliance on the existing alignment. Bethmann had given 
up the hope of bringing Germany and Great Britain together,
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and he remained stubbornly suspicious of British motives 
throughout the Balkan Wars. Only in the summer of 1913 
did he begin to accept the Anglo-German co-operation which 
had come about despite his disillusionment.
In August 1913, when Austria claimed that Germany had
deserted her, the startled Chancellor found himself drifting
away from his firmest ally, but still a long way from England-
in other words, at sea. His natural reaction was to grasp
for security. In July 1914, he still feared for the solidar-
-1ity of his one useful alliance. "Our old dilemma in every 
Austrian move in the Balkans : if we encourage them, they say
we pushed them into it ; if we discourage them, they say we 
have deserted them. Then they approach the Western Powers, 
who are waiting with open arms." Germany, the Chancellor 
thought, could not afford to further alienate her ally; his 
support of Austria in 1914 was immediate and unconditional.
The Chancellor could have prevented the war in July 
of 1914, had he been willing to risk a deterioration of his 
country's "Great-Power" status. This he was not prepared 
to do; probably he did not even consider it as a real al­
ternative. Thus, he could easily convince himself that he 
had now no choice but to support his ally. Precisely the
16 July 1914, reported by Bethmann's private secretary 
Riezler, in Karl Dietrich Erdmann, "Eur Beurteilung Bethmann 
Hollwegs," Geschichte in Wissenschaft und ünterricht (Sept, 
1964) 529-40: ' '
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same can be said of all the chief executives of the other 
"Great Powers" of Europe, Their refusal to risk diplomatic 
status even in view of the well-known and immense dangers 
involved can be partly explained by their attitude towards 
wr,r in general. While they all feared and condemned it, 
they still retained some feeling of "war idealism," a feel­
ing that, despite its horrors, war brought out the supreme 
virtues of self-sacrifice and national unity. Among the 
statesmen of Europe, there was not one who would make signifi­
cant sacrifices to save the peace.
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